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Abstract 
 
This dissertation consists of three independent papers, each defending the Higher-
Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness against a different objection.  First the 
HOT theory is defended against the Theory of Mind (TOM) Objection.  Since the HOT 
theory requires that a subject be able to represent mental states in thought in order to have 
mental states that are conscious, objectors argue from empirical evidence that few 
creatures pass TOM tests to the conclusion that few creatures must be capable of having 
conscious mental states according to the HOT theory.  The counter-intuitiveness of this 
claim is then taken as reason for rejecting the HOT theory.  I argue that this objection is 
based on a false assumption - that the requirements of successful TOM test performance 
parallel the requirements outlined by the HOT theory.  Since this assumption is false, we 
can reject the objection.  In the second paper, I defend the HOT theory against the 
Phenomenal Character Argument.  Objectors argue that the HOT theory must be rejected 
because it incorrectly characterizes the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state 
consciousness as necessarily involving a consciousness of the fact that one has a 
particular mental state.  I argue that the theory cannot provide this characterization of 
phenomenal character because the theory cannot say that someone becomes conscious of 
what her unconscious HOTs represent.  Since the objection rests on an incorrect 
interpretation of the theory, we can reject the objection.  In the final paper, I defend the 
HOT theory against the Misrepresentation Objection.  Here objectors accuse the HOT 
theory of presenting necessary and sufficient conditions for conscious states that turn out 
to be incompatible in empty HOT cases (cases wherein one’s HOT misrepresents the 
states one is instantiating).  I argue that the conditions are actually each part of separate 
explanations of separate sorts of consciousness, that neither of the separate explanations 
has internally incompatible conditions, and hence that the objection is based on an 
equivocation on two senses of the phrase ‘conscious state’.  Since the objection is based 
on this error, we can reject the objection. 
 
Keywords: Higher-Order Thought, Consciousness, David Rosenthal, Theory of Mind, 
Metacognition, Phenomenal Character, Empty HOTs, Metaphysics of Mind. 
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Introduction 
 
The Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness is a fascinating 
hypothesis about the underpinnings of mental state consciousness and the nature of 
conscious experience.  As it is most commonly understood, the theory explains our 
conscious mental states in terms of a higher-order awareness we come to have of those 
states and it explains our phenomenal experiences in terms of the way this awareness 
characterizes our mental environment.  Specifically, HOT theorists argue that a mental 
state’s consciousness is constituted by one’s representing oneself as being in a lower-
order mental state by means of forming an appropriate higher-order thought. 
As the title of this dissertation suggests, I intend to present and defend a refined 
version of the HOT Theory.  I achieve this by exploring the theory through the lens of 
three different objections:  The Theory of Mind Objection, the Phenomenal Character 
Argument, and The Misrepresentation Objection.  As we will see, each objection is 
directed toward a different aspect of the HOT theory and, as I will argue, each objection 
can be defeated by bringing out some of the often unnoticed subtleties within the theory.  
Hence what results is a refined version of the HOT theory, in the sense that we replace 
our usual understanding of the theory with a more careful and nuanced interpretation.   
Since the goal is to bring out the subtle nuances of the HOT theory and to 
demonstrate how these nuances help the theory address various objections, I make a few 
important methodological choices.  First, because the details matter in such a project, and 
because different theorists each tend to promote a slightly different variation of the 
theory, within this dissertation I focus exclusively on one of the most accepted and well-
! #"
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known versions of the HOT theory – David Rosenthal’s (1986, 2005) Actualist HOT 
Theory.
1
  Only by sacrificing breadth for depth can one explore the nuances that I argue 
are important.   
Second, I choose to structure my discussions from within the conceptual 
framework with which the HOT theory is most commonly understood and to express any 
refinements that emerge with new terminology.  This means, for example, that though 
Rosenthal has suggested his own refinements to the theory when responding to some of 
these objections, I will present an independent account of how the theory ought to be 
interpreted.
2
  
I choose this option because it is important to me that the objectors be able to 
follow my path to a new, refined interpretation of the theory and I feel the best way to 
achieve this is to start from common ground and show how the new refinements develop 
out of the conceptual framework with which the objectors are most familiar.  
With these notes in mind, let me present an overview of the three papers that 
constitute this dissertation.   
In the first paper I defend the HOT theory against the Theory of Mind Objection.
3
  
Since HOT theorists argue that one must represent one’s lower-order mental state with an 
appropriate HOT, in order for that lower-order state to be conscious, their account entails 
that for a person to have any conscious mental states at all, she must have the general 
capacity to represent her mental states in thought.  Many see this requirement as a reason 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
$
"For examples of other Higher-Order accounts of consciousness see Gennaro (1996), Carruthers (2000) 
and Lycan (1996). 
%
"For example, though Rosenthal often describes the property of mental state consciousness as being a 
relational property of mental states (see Rosenthal (2002) for example), we learn from his responses to the 
Misrepresentation Objection that this characterization of state consciousness must be refined (see Rosenthal 
(2003, 2011) for example).  
&
"For examples of this objection in the literature see Dretske (1995), Ch. 4 or Seager (2004)."
! $"
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to reject the HOT theory.  Specifically, proponents of the Theory of Mind objection argue 
that very few creatures on earth seem capable of representing mental states in thought, 
and hence that the HOT theory entails that very few creatures on earth are capable of 
having conscious mental states at all.  The counter-intuitiveness of this claim is taken as 
reason for rejecting the HOT theory as an explanation of mental state consciousness. 
To support the claim that few creatures have the capacity to represent mental 
states in thought, objectors appeal to evidence from Theory of Mind (TOM) research 
conducted in Developmental and Comparative Psychology, hence this objection is 
referred to as the Theory of Mind Objection.  A person is said to have a theory of mind 
when she is able to successfully predict or explain someone else’s behaviour by 
attributing to that other person certain mental states.
4
  Since studies reveal that most non-
human animals and most human infants lack a competence in Theory of Mind, objectors 
reason from this evidence to the conclusion that those who fail these tests must lack the 
capacities the HOT theory requires for mental state consciousness.
5
 
I argue that in order to take the failure of subjects on TOM tests as evidence 
against the HOT theory, however, one must assume that the requirements of successful 
performance on TOM tests parallel the very requirements for mental state consciousness 
outlined by the HOT theory.  I call this the Parallel Requirements Assumption and I argue 
that it turns out to be false when assessed in relation to the standard verbal TOM tests that 
are taken as support for the TOM objection.  In light of this fact I conclude that the TOM 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
'
"Premack and Woodruff (1978) originally introduced the term ‘theory of mind’."
(
"For early studies demonstrating that human infants do not show evidence of these abilities until around the 
age of 4 years see Wimmer and Perner (1983) and Perner, Leekam, and Wimmer, (1987).  For discussion of 
these abilities in nonhuman animals, consider the research on chimpanzees, a population considered among 
the most likely nonhuman population to have these abilities.  Though researchers continue to debate about 
the theory of mind skills chimpanzees may or may not have, there has yet to be any uncontroversial 
evidence of false belief understanding in this population.  For representative studies from both sides of the 
debate see Povinelli, Nelson, and Boysen (1990) and Hare, Call, and Tomasello (2001)."
! %"
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objection must be rejected.  (I also show that we can reject a similar argument that might 
be created, this time in support of the HOT theory, on the basis of newly emerging 
evidence that young human infants can pass non-verbal TOM tests.
6
  Since such an 
argument would also require adopting the Parallel Requirements Assumption, and since I 
argue that this assumption is not justified relative to these tests either, I conclude that this 
argument also must be rejected.)   
In order to demonstrate that the Parallel Requirements Assumption is unjustified, 
I provide an interpretation of a rarely acknowledged aspect of the theory, namely, its 
account of phenomenal character.  In particular, I argue that the HOT theory dictates that 
when a mental state, M, is represented by an appropriate HOT, and hence when M is state 
conscious, the creature instantiating this state will become conscious of what M 
represents.  This allows me to show that the standard verbal TOM tests require cognition 
that is structurally more complex than what the HOT theory requires for mental state 
consciousness (and it allows me to show that new nonverbal TOM tests might require 
cognition that is structurally less complex than what the HOT theory requires for mental 
state consciousness).  As it turns out then, TOM tests do not measure what the HOT 
theory requires for mental state consciousness, and hence TOM tests cannot support 
arguments about the plausibility of these requirements.  The TOM objection must 
therefore be rejected.  
The second paper is a defense of the HOT theory against Robert Lurz’s (2003, 
2006) Phenomenal Character Argument.  It is also an opportunity to initiate a much 
needed discussion of the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character.  According to 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
)
"For example, see Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) and Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007). 
! &"
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Lurz, the HOT theory accounts for phenomenal character by claiming that one 
necessarily becomes conscious of the fact that one has that particular mental state 
whenever one comes to have a mental state that is conscious.  Lurz demonstrates, 
however, that this characterization of phenomenal character is false and so he concludes 
that we ought to reject the HOT theory as an explanation of phenomenal character. 
I argue that Lurz’s interpretation of the HOT theory must be incorrect, since the 
HOT theory cannot say that the phenomenal character affiliated with mental state 
consciousness involves one’s becoming conscious of what one’s (unconscious) HOTs 
represent.  In light of this error I conclude that Lurz’s objection must be rejected.   
I end this paper by discussing an implication of my argument, namely, that there 
must be an important distinction between the account of what grounds mental state 
consciousness that is offered by the HOT theory and the account of what it’s like to have 
conscious mental states that is offered by the HOT theory.  These accounts are distinct, I 
argue, because only one can be provided in terms of higher-order representation.  The 
idea that there is separation between these two accounts, and the details emerging about 
the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character, are two of the primary revisions that 
comprise the refined understanding of the HOT theory that I hope to deliver throughout 
the dissertation.   
In the third paper I defend the HOT theory against Ned Block’s (2011a, 2011b) 
version of the Misrepresentation Objection.  The HOT theory claims that a mental state is 
conscious only if it is represented by an appropriate HOT, but the theory allows that a 
HOT might misrepresent a person as being in a state that she is not in fact instantiating.  
Furthermore, the theory allows that, despite this misrepresentation, it would still seem to 
! '"
!
the person that she is in the state she, in fact, is not instantiating.
7
  Such cases of 
misrepresentation are known in the literature as empty HOT cases.   
Block argues that these cases prove fatal to the HOT theory, because they reveal 
that the conditions the theory sets out as being necessary and sufficient for conscious 
states actually lead to incompatible predictions about the presence of conscious states in 
empty HOT cases.  In particular, it would appear that the HOT theory is committed to 
there being something it’s like for a creature, and hence committed to there being a 
conscious state in empty HOT cases, despite the fact that there is no instantiated lower-
order mental state to which we might attribute the property of mental state consciousness.  
In light of this result, Block concludes that we cannot accept the explanation of conscious 
states provided by the HOT theory and hence that the HOT theory must be rejected.  
I argue that Block’s Misrepresentation Objection can be seen as being based on an 
equivocation of two senses of the phrase ‘conscious state’ – a state consciousness sense 
of this phrase and a new, subject consciousness sense of the phrase.  I demonstrate how 
the HOT theory can be seen as providing separate explanations of both sorts of 
consciousness identified by these senses of ‘conscious state’ and I argue that neither of 
these explanations lead to incompatible predictions, as Block originally objected.  In light 
of this fact I conclude that Block’s Misrepresentation Objection must be rejected.  
Here we see a result similar to the conclusion of the previous paper.  Once again it 
appears that the HOT theory is providing distinct explanations of what constitutes state 
consciousness and of phenomenal character.  In this paper I also provide a brief 
discussion of a potentially surprising consequence of this way of interpreting the HOT 
theory, namely, that the property we traditionally identify as mental state consciousness 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
*
"For example, see Rosenthal (2004), especially pg. 32-35 and Rosenthal (2005), especially pg. 217-218."
! ("
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turns out actually to play a less important role in the theory’s explanation of phenomenal 
character than might have been expected.    
And thus we complete our outline of the arguments that comprise this 
dissertation.  With this overview in hand, I would like to highlight some aspects of the 
refined HOT theory that I think emerge from these discussions.  In order to bring light to 
this new way of interpreting the HOT theory, I will briefly review how each objection 
attacks a slightly different aspect of the theory and how each reply brings out a slightly 
different refinement to our understanding of the HOT theory.  
 First, we see that the TOM objection attacks the theory’s metarepresentational 
requirement.  My reply is not to deny that the theory has such a requirement, rather it is to 
demonstrate that, with a proper understanding of the HOT theory’s account of 
phenomenal character, it becomes clear that the TOM tests cannot be measuring the 
metarepresentational capacities the HOT theory requires.  Since the TOM tests do not 
track these abilities, however, a subject’s performance on these tests cannot inform us 
about whether that creature has what it takes to have mental states that are conscious, 
according to the HOT theory.  Hence the TOM Objection, which is based on the evidence 
from these TOM tests, can be rejected.  What we learn from this paper, then, in terms of 
the refined HOT theory, is that there is a rich account of phenomenal character within the 
HOT theory that may have unnoticed explanatory power.   
Second, we see that the Phenomenal Character Argument attacks what Lurz 
(2003, 2006) takes to be the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character.  My reply is 
to argue that Lurz misrepresents the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character.  By 
showing that the HOT theorists cannot provide the account Lurz takes them to offer, we 
! )"
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are able to reject the Phenomenal Character Argument.  What we learn from this paper, 
then, about the refined HOT theory, is that the HOT theory cannot provide an account of 
phenomenal character in terms of higher-order representation, so the theory’s account of 
phenomenal character must be importantly distinct from its account of what constitutes 
mental state consciousness. 
 Finally, we see that the Misrepresentation Objection attacks the HOT theory by 
questioning the role of mental state consciousness in the theory’s explanation of 
phenomenal character.  My reply is to demonstrate how, on our refined understanding of 
the HOT theory, mental state consciousness does turn out to be quite independent from 
phenomenal character.  I also demonstrate, however, that there is an alternative account 
of phenomenal character provided by the theory, so I show that nothing is lost by 
separating these two aspects of the theory.  What we learn from this paper, then, about the 
refined HOT theory, is that the HOT theory’s account of mental state consciousness plays 
a less central role in the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character than was 
previously expected.  
With this summary it becomes clear that a common thread is emerging throughout 
the dissertation.  Specifically, the refined understanding of the HOT theory reveals that 
there is an important and largely unnoticed separation between the account of 
phenomenal character we see emerging from the HOT theory and the account of mental 
state consciousness that is more often the target of philosophical discussions of the HOT 
theory.  Furthermore, despite failing to get as much critical attention, we learn that the 
HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character may be the more important and powerful 
account of the two offered by the theory.  In light of these emerging ideas, the most 
! *"
!
important lesson I hope this dissertation provides is that we ought to turn our 
philosophical attention away from the HOT theory’s account of mental state 
consciousness and toward this theory’s rich and nuanced theory of phenomenal character. 
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Paper 1: Against the Theory of Mind Objection and the General Use of 
Theory of Mind Research in Assessing the Higher-Order Thought Theory 
of Consciousness 
 
1. Introduction   
According to the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness, a mental state 
is conscious if and only if it is represented by an appropriate higher-order thought (HOT) 
to the effect that one is in that particular mental state.  This entails, however, that for a 
person to have any conscious mental states at all, she must have the general capacity to 
represent mental states in thought.  Many see this requirement as a reason to reject the 
HOT theory.  Specifically, objectors argue that very few creatures on earth are capable of 
representing mental states in thought, and hence that the HOT theory entails that very few 
creatures on earth are capable of having conscious mental states at all.  The counter-
intuitiveness of this claim is taken as reason for rejecting the HOT theory as an 
explanation of mental state consciousness. 
I refer to this objection as the Theory of Mind Objection because the objectors 
appeal to the Theory of Mind (TOM) research conducted in Developmental and 
Comparative Psychology in order to support their claim that few creatures have the 
capacity to represent mental states in thought.  Studies in these fields reveal that most 
non-human animals and most human infants lack a competence in Theory of Mind, i.e., 
these subjects are unable to successfully predict or explain someone else’s behaviour 
when doing so requires attributing to that other person certain mental states.  As 
mentioned, objectors then reason from this evidence to the conclusion that those who fail 
!!!"#!
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these tests must lack the capacities the HOT theory requires for mental state 
consciousness. 
Since this objection was first formulated, new evidence has emerged showing that 
human infants actually can pass nonverbal versions of the standard TOM tests.  HOT 
theorists now might appeal to this new evidence and argue that the success of infants on 
these new nonverbal TOM tests shows that infants do have what the HOT theory requires 
for mental state consciousness after all.  Hence the defender of the HOT theory might 
thereby create her own TOM argument against the TOM objection.  
My goal in this discussion is to identify a common assumption held by both sides 
of this debate and to argue that this assumption is unwarranted.  Specifically, in order to 
take the success or failure of subjects on TOM tests as evidence for or against the HOT 
theory, one must assume that the requirements of successful performance on TOM tests 
parallel the very requirements for mental state consciousness that are outlined by the 
HOT theory.  I call this the Parallel Requirements Assumption and I argue that it turns 
out to be false when assessed in relation to the standard verbal TOM tests (which are 
taken as support for the TOM objection) and, at the very least, that it turns out to be not 
clearly true when assessed in relation to the new nonverbal TOM tests (which can be 
taken as evidence against the TOM objection).  Since philosophers on either side of the 
debate are not justified in holding this assumption, I conclude that both the TOM 
Objection and the HOT theorist’s own argument against the TOM objection must be 
rejected.    
To keep this paper to a manageable length, I limit my inquiry to an assessment of 
the standard Sally-Anne TOM test paradigm, as well as its new non-verbal counter-parts.  
!!!"$!
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I also restrict my discussion to only the experiments involving typically developing 
human infants and toddlers, for the most part.  Finally, I ignore the possible issue of 
whether these other-directed tests really do measure the self-directed ability that HOT 
theory requires
1
 and I restrict this discussion to David Rosenthal’s (2002a, 2002b, 2005) 
Actualist version of the HOT theory of consciousness.
2
     
My plan for the paper is as follows:  I begin with an outline of the HOT Theory of 
Consciousness, focusing mainly on points that will be relevant to my later assessment of 
the two TOM-based arguments.  I then introduce the two types of TOM tests and the two 
TOM-based arguments, one being the TOM objection to HOT theory and the other being 
the argument on behalf of the HOT theory against the TOM objection.  Here I also 
introduce the Parallel Requirements Assumption that grounds both of these arguments.  
Next, I identify some important differences between the two forms of TOM tests, which 
help me in finally articulating the demands of both tests in the language of the HOT 
theory.  I conclude by demonstrating that the demands of these TOM tests are not parallel 
to the demands of the HOT theory, thus that the Parallel Requirements Assumption is 
false and that both arguments must be rejected. 
 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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"The problem referred to here is as follows: Most theory of mind tests ask a subject to focus on the 
behaviour and mental states of others, rather than on the subject’s own mental states and actions.  For 
example, a subject might be asked to predict what another person will do when that person arrives in the 
testing room.  The HOT Theory, on the other hand, would require for consciousness only that a person be 
able to pick out her own mental states.  As Carruthers (2009) argues, however, the ability to pick out one’s 
own mental states might be completely separate from the ability to pick out the mental states of others.  The 
implication would be then that these other-directed TOM tests are not measures of the self-directed skills 
required by the HOT theory.  The fact that the HOT theory and the TOM tests might tap these different 
skills, and indeed the very theory that these are in fact different skills, are two topics we will not address 
here.  I mention them only to alert the reader. 
2
 Though my argument is presented as a defense of Rosenthal’s Actualist HOT Theory (Rosenthal 2002a, 
2002b, 2005), it is an interesting question whether the TOM objection would be applicable, and if so 
whether the same response would be available, for other sorts of Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.  
I highlight this for the reader, though it is not a question I intend to address here.  For examples of other 
Higher-Order accounts of consciousness see Gennaro (1996), Carruthers (2000) and Lycan (1996). 
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2. The Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness  
To introduce Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness, it is 
helpful to begin by looking at some of the assumptions on which the theory is founded.  
One such assumption is that certain mental states can be conscious at one moment and 
unconscious at the next, or vice versa.  The property a state is said to have when it’s 
conscious and is said to lack when it’s unconscious is called state consciousness.
3
  The 
HOT theory is a proposal about how best to explain state consciousness. 
State consciousness can be contrasted with other sorts of properties we might pick 
out with the term ‘consciousness’.  For example, we might say of a person that she is 
conscious of something.  Since ‘conscious’ is here used in a transitive sense – it requires 
the specification of a direct object – this sort of consciousness is referred to as transitive 
consciousness, and since it is attributed solely to people or other suitable creatures – we 
don’t say of a mental state that it is conscious of something – this sort of consciousness is 
referred to more formally as transitive creature consciousness.  We might also say of a 
person that she is conscious, full-stop, meaning that she is awake and responsive to 
stimuli as opposed to being unconscious, knocked out, or asleep.  Since this sense of 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3
 Though HOT theorists most often claim that state consciousness is a relational property (i.e., that it is a 
property that consists in the intentional relationship between a first-order state and an appropriate HOT 
about that first-order state, for example, see Rosenthal (2002a)), in his most careful moments Rosenthal 
says that this characterization is not strictly speaking accurate.  Rather, Rosenthal says that state 
consciousness does consist in something’s being a state one represents oneself as being in via an 
appropriate HOT, but he also insists that this something can have this property regardless of whether or not 
there is an actually instantiated first-order state to which we would normally attribute the property of state 
consciousness.  This means that, strictly speaking, we cannot really consider state consciousness to be a 
property, even if relational, that is attributed to first-order mental states. Instead, it appears Rosenthal 
intends that this something to which we actually attribute state consciousness is a merely notional state, a 
state that is an intentional item, rather than being an actually instantiated mental state.  (For more on this 
more careful account of state consciousness, see Rosenthal (2003, 2011).)  Because adjusting our way of 
speaking to reflect Rosenthal’s most careful view makes the debate I’d like to address here unnecessarily 
complicated, I will follow the HOT theorists’ own example and just treat state consciousness as though it is 
simply a relational property attributed to a mental state.  That being said, I do believe that nothing I say in 
this paper is incompatible with Rosenthal’s more careful account of state consciousness, though I leave it 
for another time to argue for this point. 
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‘conscious’ does not require the specification of a direct object, and since it is attributed 
to a person or other suitable creature here, it is referred to as intransitive creature 
consciousness.  
Aside from these distinctions among different senses of ‘consciousness’, there is 
also an important distinction we will need to draw between mere ‘awareness’ and full-
blown ‘consciousness’.
4
    
Thomas Nagel (1974) famously argues that those wishing to explain 
consciousness must be wary of overlooking the very feature that makes consciousness 
interesting in the first place.  This feature, according to Nagel, is something subjective 
and experiential, something it’s like for an organism to be conscious or to have a 
conscious mental state.
5
  This essential, subjective nature of consciousness is also 
sometimes referred to as the qualitative or phenomenal character of consciousness or 
simply as what-it’s-like-ness.  (I will use these terms interchangeably throughout our 
discussion.)
6
  These terms are all meant to capture, for example, the redness one 
experiences when one consciously sees a red tomato or the painfulness one feels when 
one consciously pinches a finger in a door.  The lesson from Nagel’s argument is that, 
whatever we may end up identifying with the designation ‘consciousness’, we must be 
sure that we are identifying something that essentially involves this what-it’s-like-ness.  
Hence I propose that we accept Nagel’s lesson and therefore reserve any use of the term 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4
 This distinction is also suggested in Chalmers (1995). 
5
 As Nagel writes, “…the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there 
is something it’s like to be that organism…something it is like for the organism” (Nagel 1974, p. 436, 
original emphasis).  
6
 Note that I intend no theoretical ties to any one particular theory of phenomenal character when I use the 
term ‘phenomenal character’ or any of the other terms mentioned here.  For example, despite mentioning 
Block’s (2011) term for this aspect of experience (i.e., ‘what-it’s-like-ness’), I do not intend to have any 
ties to the specific theory of phenomenal consciousness that Block himself endorses (see Block 1995).  
Instead, I just mean to identify what Weisberg (2011) calls the “moderate” reading of these terms. 
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‘consciousness’ for all and only those phenomena and properties that involve some 
affiliated what-it’s-like-ness.  
On the other hand, research has shown time and again that we can have all sorts of 
unconscious mental states, for which there’s nothing it’s like to be instantiating them but 
which nonetheless afford us a sort of mere awareness of what they represent.  A 
fascinating example of this can be seen in cases of blindsight.   
Due to damage to the striate cortex, patients suffering from blindsight develop a 
pathological ‘blind’ region in their visual field where they report that they cannot see any 
stimuli.  Forced-choice experiments soon revealed, however, that patients were actually 
registering information from these blind regions after all.  For example, Weiskrantz et al. 
(1974), tested blindsight patients by placing images of either vertical or horizontal lines 
in such a way as to fall within the patients’ pathological blindspot.  The researchers then 
forced the patients to choose which way the various lines were slanted.  Interestingly, 
though the patients adamantly denied seeing any of the lines, they actually chose the 
correct orientation a statistically significant amount of the time.  This led the researchers 
to conclude that the patients were registering information about the lines after all, the 
problem is just that there’s nothing it’s like for the patients to be ‘seeing’ the lines.
7
 
There are a few important facts to take note of here.  First, because these 
blindsight patients are able to guess the correct orientation of the lines a statistically 
significant amount of the time, it’s rather clear that they must be forming visual 
representations of the lines and also that they do thereby come to have some sort of 
awareness of those lines.  Second, however, since the blindsight patients also adamantly 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
7
 For more detailed information please see Weiskrantz et al. (1974), Experiment 3. 
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deny that they can see any of the lines at all, we must conclude that the awareness of the 
lines that blindsight patients are afforded by their representations is a kind of unconscious 
awareness.  It is this sort of unconscious awareness that we must be careful to contrast 
with the full-blown consciousness discussed above.   
To that end, as mentioned, we will reserve the term ‘consciousness’ for all and 
only those phenomena associated with some kind of what-it’s-like-ness, and we will 
introduce the term ‘awareness’ for any sort of mental registration of information that has 
no affiliated what-it’s-like-ness.  In light of this clarification, we can redraw the 
distinctions introduced earlier as follows:  We will say that if a mental state is state 
conscious, then there is something it’s like for the bearer of that state to be instantiating 
that mental state at that time.
8
  If there’s nothing it’s like for a person to be in a particular 
mental state, then that mental state is not state conscious.   
We will also say that if a person or other suitable creature is transitively creature 
conscious of some object, then not only must that person be mentally registering 
information about the object, but also there must be something it’s like for that person to 
be registering that information.  On the other hand, if this what-it’s-like-ness is missing, 
yet there is still reason to think the person is representing some object (as is the case in 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
8
 We should also note that it is unclear whether or not Rosenthal would agree with this assumption.  On the 
one hand, Rosenthal often says that the phenomenal character we experience when our sensations and 
perceptions are conscious is due to our representing, via HOTs, various special, qualitative properties that 
only sensory states have.  (See, for example, Rosenthal (2004).)  It might, then, appear that Rosenthal 
would not endorse the view that conscious beliefs, say, have something it’s like for their bearers to be 
instantiating them, because beliefs fail to have these qualitative properties.  On the other hand, Rosenthal 
also says, for example, that, “[a] state’s being conscious is a matter of mental appearance – of how one’s 
mental life appears to one. …a state is conscious only if one is subjectively aware of oneself as being in 
that state” (Rosenthal (2011), p. 431).  With this sort of description of conscious experience, which makes 
no appeals to sensory qualities per se but rather only to subjective appearances, there seems to be no good 
reason to deny that there would be a subjective appearance affiliated with being in a conscious belief in 
addition to there being subjective appearances of being in conscious sensory states.  Since Rosenthal’s 
position is unclear and since our discussion is simpler if we adopt the more inclusive thesis, I will assume 
in this paper that all state conscious mental states have some sort of affiliated what-it’s-like-ness.  
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blindsight, for example), we will say instead the person is transitively creature aware of 
what she is representing.   
Finally, we will attribute intransitive creature consciousness only when a creature 
is awake and responsive to stimuli and there’s something it’s like for the creature to be 
awake and responsive.  We will introduce the term intransitive creature awareness to 
identify what we attribute to a creature that is merely awake and responsive to stimuli, 
but for whom there is nothing it’s like to be awake and responsive.  (For example, a 
philosophical zombie would be intransitively creature aware.)  With this terminology 
now fully clear, we can carry on with our introduction of the HOT theory.    
A second assumption on which the HOT theory is based is actually an insight 
borrowed from the everyday folk: We find it natural to say that if a person is not aware of 
her mental state in any way, then her mental state is not conscious.  This implies, 
conversely, that a conscious mental state must be a state a person is aware of being in.  
HOT theorists take this folk intuition to entail that the difference between a mental state 
when it’s state conscious and when it’s unconscious lies in its possessor’s awareness of it, 
and so they set out to explain state consciousness in terms of a person’s transitive creature 
awareness of her own mental states.  As you might have guessed, HOT theorists say that 
one comes to have this sort of transitive creature awareness of one’s own mental states by 
forming higher-order thoughts about those mental states.  Specifically, HOT theorists 
argue that a mental state is state conscious if and only if that mental state is represented 
by an appropriate higher-order thought (HOT).   
According to Rosenthal, a HOT is appropriate when it is noninferential (i.e. it is 
not the product of any conscious inference or observation), when it is nondispositional 
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(i.e., when a person actually instantiates the HOT rather than merely having a disposition 
to form such a HOT), when it is assertoric (i.e., when the propositional attitude of the 
thought is one of assertion), and when the HOT represents its bearer as being in a 
particular mental state (for example, only an appropriately formed HOT with the content, 
roughly, “I believe that all people are equal” will result in the conscious belief that all 
people are equal).  Though these conditions are important components of the theory, they 
will not play a crucial role in our current discussion, so I will refrain from providing any 
further explanation of them here.
9
 
Notice that the term ‘higher-order’ is simply meant to highlight the fact that the 
required thoughts are mental representations of other mental representations.  
Psychologists also refer to these sorts of HOTs as metarepresentations.  Because it will be 
important for us to keep track of the level of metarepresentation involved in various 
thoughts throughout our discussion, I will introduce the term ‘representational structure’ 
to pick out the level or order of representation that a particular mental state has.  For 
example, we will say that a belief about objects in the world has a first-order 
representational structure because the belief simply represents objects external to the 
mind rather than representing any other mental states.  On the other hand, we will say that 
a thought about a first-order belief has a second-order representational structure because 
it does involve metarepresentation – it is a mental representation of another mental state 
(the first-order belief).  If one were to form a doubt about a thought about a belief 
(perhaps someone in the grips of Cartesian skepticism would be moved to do such a 
thing) then this doubt will have a third-order representational structure, because the doubt 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
9
 For a concise discussion of the conditions that make a HOT appropriate as well as the arguments leading 
to the HOT theory account of state consciousness presented here see Rosenthal (2002b), especially Section 
II, “The Hypothesis”, pg. 408-411.   
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is a representation of another mental state (the thought) which itself is also a 
representation of another mental state (the belief).  And so we can keep attributing higher 
and higher representational orders as the representational structure of a mental state gets 
more and more complex.  To put the central thesis of the HOT theory in this new 
terminology then, HOT theorists argue that a first-order mental state is state conscious 
only when it is represented by an appropriate second-order thought. 
The explanation so far is an explanation of basic state consciousness.  Basic state 
consciousness results from the formation of a second-order thought representing oneself 
as being in a particular first-order state and it is taken to be the sort of state consciousness 
that we have unreflectively and most often in everyday life.  HOT theorists also provide 
an account of introspective state consciousness.  Introspective state consciousness results 
from the formation of a third-order thought representing oneself as being in a second-
order state and it is taken to involve a more deliberate sort of reflection on our own 
mental states.
10
  Such a third-order thought, for example, might have the content, roughly, 
“I think that I believe that all people are equal” and the formation of such a thought will 
result in one’s second-order thought becoming state conscious.   
There are two interesting things to note about the difference between these two 
accounts.  First, since the HOTs required for basic state consciousness are not, 
themselves, the objects of any higher-order thoughts, they are not, themselves, state 
conscious mental states.  Rather, only when one forms a third-order thought about one’s 
second-order thought, and hence, only when one has introspective state consciousness, 
does that second-order thought become state conscious itself.  Second, there will be a 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
10
 For further discussion of the difference between basic and introspective state consciousness see, for 
example, Rosenthal (2005), Ch. 4. 
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phenomenological difference between basic and introspective state consciousness.  To 
draw this out, let’s look at the HOT theory’s account of the phenomenal character of state 
consciousness. 
We agreed earlier that in attributing state consciousness, HOT theorists must be 
claiming that there comes to be something it’s like for the creature who instantiates the 
state conscious mental state.  Further, we agreed that when a mental state is not state 
conscious, there must not be anything it’s like for the creature to be instantiating that 
state.  Considering the simpler case first, i.e., basic state consciousness, there are two 
separate representations involved in basic state consciousness, a first-order representation 
of objects and facts in the world and a second-order representation of oneself as being in 
that first-order state.
11
  This means that there are two options for what one might become 
conscious of, and hence two options for characterizing what it’s like for one, when one’s 
mental state is state conscious:  One might become conscious of what one’s HOT 
represents or one might become conscious of what one’s first-order state represents.   
Some philosophers, for example, Lurz (2006), do take the HOT theorists to be 
endorsing the former claim but I think it’s pretty clear HOT theorists cannot be doing 
that.  After all, the HOTs that afford basic state consciousness are, themselves, 
unconscious mental states and, in categorizing them as unconscious states, HOT theorists 
must mean that there is nothing it’s like to be instantiating those HOTs.  If HOT theorists 
were to claim that basic state consciousness involves becoming conscious of what one’s 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
11
 Strictly speaking, the HOT theory does not require that both an appropriate HOT as well as a first-order 
state actually be instantiated in order for there to be basic state consciousness.  Instead, Rosenthal’s theory 
allows for the admittedly rare possibility of ‘empty HOT’ cases, wherein a HOT misrepresents its bearer as 
being in a particular lower-order state, even though no such lower-order state is instantiated.  (This is the 
sort of possibility that Rosenthal means to account for with his more careful description of state 
consciousness, as discussed in footnote 3.)  As I mentioned earlier, however, we will ignore this 
complication here, in order to avoid unnecessarily complicating our discussion. 
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HOT represents, then they would be claiming that there is something it’s like for one to 
be instantiating that HOT, hence they would be contradicting their own claim that the 
HOT is not state conscious.  Instead, I propose that HOT theorists are actually making the 
second claim introduced above, namely, that when one has a state conscious state in the 
basic sense, one comes to be conscious of what one’s first-order state represents.  Let’s 
formalize this insight with the Phenomenal Character Principle: 
The Phenomenal Character Principle: When a mental state, M, is 
represented by an appropriate HOT, and hence when M is state conscious, 
the creature instantiating these states will become transitively creature 
conscious of what M represents. 
 
There’s another side to this story as well however.  Earlier we learned that when 
one’s mental states are not state conscious, one still can be afforded a mere awareness of 
what one’s mental states represent.  (We saw this in the case of blindsight for example.)  
We took this to mean that someone can be differentially responsive to what her 
unconscious state represents, even though there’s no what-it’s-like-ness affiliated with 
her being in that state.  We can formalize this point with the Awareness Principle: 
The Awareness Principle: Let M be any mental state that at times can be 
state conscious and at other times can be unconscious.  When a subject 
instantiates M without also forming an appropriate HOT about being in M, 
M will enable the subject to be transitively creature aware of what M 
represents and hence differentially responsive to what M represents, but 
since M will not be state conscious, there will not be anything it’s like for 
the subject to be instantiating M at that time. 
 
If we take these two principles together now, we see that a full characterization of 
what it’s like for a person who has a basic state conscious mental state is as follows:  A 
person who has a state conscious mental state, in the basic sense, will be transitively 
creature conscious of what her first-order mental state represents and, since she forms a 
second-order thought that is unconscious, she will also be transitively creature aware of 
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what her second-order thought represents.  So, for example, if someone instantiates the 
belief that all people are equal, and this person also forms an appropriate HOT that she 
has such a belief, she will become transitively creature conscious of the fact that all 
people are equal and she will become transitively creature aware of herself as having that 
belief. 
With these two principles we can draw out a full characterization of the 
phenomenal character of introspective state consciousness as well.  Since, as we saw, 
introspective state consciousness involves forming a third-order thought that, in turn, 
makes it the case that one’s second-order thought is state conscious, we can see that a 
person with an introspectively state conscious mental state will become transitively 
creature conscious of what her second-order thought represents and she will become 
transitively creature aware of what her third-order thought represents.  So, in terms of the 
example above, a person will come to be transitively creature conscious of herself as 
believing that all people are equal (and thereby also transitively creature conscious of the 
fact that all people are equal) and she will come to be transitively creature aware of 
herself as thinking that she believes that all people are equal (since this is what she 
represents with her unconscious third-order thought).  And thus we see the HOT theory’s 
account of what it’s like for a person to have state conscious mental states in both the 
basic and the introspective senses of state consciousness.  
There is one final and rather simple point we must draw out about the HOT 
theory.  Since a HOT is simply a thought about a lower-order mental state, so to form a 
HOT in the first place one generally must be capable of representing mental states in 
thought.  As we will see, this simple point is the catalyst for the TOM objection.  
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Thus we conclude the introduction of the relevant aspects of the HOT theory.  
Let’s quickly summarize this section by highlighting the main points that will be relevant 
to our later discussion:  (1) The HOT theory dictates that a mental state is state conscious 
if and only if it is represented by an appropriate HOT to the effect that one is in that very 
state.  Basic state consciousness involves the formation of unconscious second-order 
thoughts about one’s first-order mental states whereas introspective state consciousness 
involves the formation of unconscious third-order thoughts about one’s second-order 
mental states.  (2) One must have the general capacity to represent mental states in 
thought if one is going to form the HOTs about one’s lower-order mental states that are 
required for state consciousness.  (3) When appropriately formed, a HOT about a lower-
order state makes its possessor transitively creature conscious of what the lower-order 
state represents.  (4) The formation of certain unconscious mental states will enable a 
creature to become transitively creature aware of what those states represent, though 
there will be no what-it’s-like-ness affiliated with those states so long as they fail to be 
state conscious. 
3. Two Theory of Mind Tests, Two Theory of Mind Arguments, One Assumption 
 Keeping these points about the HOT theory in mind, we are now ready to 
introduce the two sorts of theory of mind (TOM) tests and the two arguments, one against 
the HOT theory and one in support of the HOT theory, that might be based on them.  
We’ll begin by discussing the standard TOM tests and the TOM objection to the HOT 
theory.  
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3.1 Standard Verbal Theory of Mind Tests 
A child is said to have a theory of mind when she is able to attribute mental states 
to herself and others and she is able to explain and/or predict behaviour on the basis of 
those attributions.
12
  In one of the most common tests for these abilities in preschoolers, 
the Sally-Anne task, a subject is introduced to two puppets, Sally and Anne.  The puppets 
are then used to act out the following story:  Each puppet has her own container – Sally 
has a basket and Anne has a box.  Sally has a marble that she plays with for a while and 
then places in her basket.  Sally then leaves the scene.  Next, Anne moves Sally’s marble 
to the box (without Sally seeing or knowing this).  Sally then returns to play with her 
marble.  At this point in the story the subject is asked, “Where will Sally look for her 
marble?”.  The correct answer is that Sally will look in the basket.  To answer the 
question correctly, the subject must understand that Sally would still (falsely) believe that 
her marble is where she left it and that Sally would act in accordance with her (false) 
belief.  Generally, typically developing children begin to pass this test somewhere 
between the ages of three and four years old.
13
 
Notice that success on this task appears to require that a child be able to pick out 
mental states and categorize those mental states in terms of their distinctively mental 
properties and typical causal interactions.  For example, in order to predict that Sally will 
search in the basket, a child in this experiment must pick out Sally’s belief about the 
location of the marble and then figure out that Sally’s belief will influence where Sally 
searches for the marble.  It’s clear that if a child is to achieve any of this however, she 
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12
 Premack and Woodruff (1978) introduced the term ‘theory of mind’. This ability is also sometimes 
referred to as the ability to mentalize or to mindread. 
13
 For early studies demonstrating these results see Wimmer and Perner (1983) and Perner, Leekam, and 
Wimmer, (1987).  
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must be able to represent mental states in thought in the first place.  Hence there appears 
to be a parallel in the cognitive requirements for success on these TOM tests and the 
requirements for HOT formation as set out by the HOT theory.
14
  This presumed parallel 
in requirements plays a central role in both of the arguments we will consider so let’s 
represent it formally here:  
The Parallel Requirements (PR) Assumption: The general capacity to 
represent mental states in thought is both necessary for a subject to 
perform successfully on TOM tests and necessary for a subject to form the 
kinds of higher-order thoughts the HOT theory requires for basic state 
consciousness. 
 
Let’s now see how this PR Assumption is implicated in the TOM Objection. 
3.2 The Theory of Mind Objection to the Higher-Order Thought Theory of 
Consciousness 
Proponents of the TOM objection
15
 begin by noting that surprisingly few subjects 
pass TOM tests.  For example, as we just saw, typically developing children seem 
incapable of passing standard verbal TOM tests until around the age of 3 to 4 years.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14
 This point about shared requirements is more often phrased in terms of a parallel in conceptual 
requirements.  Since the HOT theory requires one to from HOTs about one’s lower-order mental states in 
order to make those lower-order states conscious, and since the formation of propositional thoughts like 
these is generally taken to involve the activation of concepts for the objects or facts represented, therefore 
in order to have any HOTs in the first place it would appear that a creature must activate a concept picking 
out the particular mental state it is representing with its HOT (for example, BELIEF THAT P).  On the other 
hand, the very skills that seem to lead to success on TOM tasks – picking out mental states and categorizing 
them in terms of their distinctively mental properties and typical causal interactions – appear to be the very 
same sorts of skills that the possession of concepts for our mental states would afford.  Since the formation 
of HOTs and one’s successful performance on TOM tests both appear to require that a person possess and 
activate mental state concepts, we see, again, a parallel in requisite abilities similar to the one outlined 
above – the possession and activation of mental state concepts appears to be necessary both for a creature to 
form the kinds of thoughts HOT theory requires for basic state consciousness and for a creature to perform 
successfully on TOM tests.  I choose not to frame the debate in terms of concept possession however, and 
instead frame it in terms of a creatures capacity to represent mental states in thought, because there is still 
a lot of disagreement among philosophers about the precise nature of concepts and about the precise 
concepts the HOT theory would require for state consciousness (for example, see Rosenthal, (2000), p. 
279).  By instead framing the debate in terms of a creature’s capacity to represent mental states in thought I 
believe we actually can make progress in this debate while avoiding the messy issues associated with 
concept possession. 
15
 For examples of this objection in the literature see Dretske (1995), Ch. 4 or Seager (2004). 
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Furthermore, and despite sometimes showing quite sophisticated cognitive abilities in 
other areas, most high-functioning people with Autism Spectrum Disorders
16
 fail to show 
TOM abilities until they achieve a verbal mental age of about 9 years
17
, if they ever show 
these abilities at all.  Finally, most non-human animals, including the great apes, appear 
incapable of passing these tests either.
18
  Objectors argue that those failing these tests 
must also lack the capacity to represent mental states in thought that the HOT theory 
requires for basic state consciousness.   
Notice that, in counting a subject’s failure on these tests as evidence that the 
subject lacks the mental capacities the HOT theory requires, the objector must be relying 
on the PR Assumption outlined above, namely, that the general capacity to represent 
mental states in thought is both necessary for a subject to perform successfully on TOM 
tests and necessary for a subject to form the kinds of higher-order thoughts the HOT 
theory requires for basic state consciousness.  Only with this assumption can the objector 
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16
 The term ‘Autism Spectrum Disorder’ covers a spectrum of developmental disorders that are 
characterized primarily by the presence of all three of the following behavioural measures: (1) impairments 
in social interaction, (2) impairments in communication, and (3) unusually restricted behaviours and 
interests.  Autism Spectrum Disorders are usually diagnosed in early childhood and the severity of 
symptoms spans from quite mild to quite severe, with the more severe cases often accompanied by other 
disorders such as epilepsy and learning disabilities.  Interestingly, in light of our topic, a popular hypothesis 
of the underlying cause of Autism Spectrum Disorders is that they stem from a breakdown in the 
mechanisms realizing Theory of Mind abilities.  For more on this Mindblindness hypothesis see Baron-
Cohen (1995) and for an excellent general overview of Autism Spectrum Disorders see Frith (2003). 
17
 Happé (1995). 
18
 For example, Povinelli, Nelson, and Boysen (1990) found that chimpanzees were unable to identify that 
they should ask for food from an experimenter who watched where the food was placed over another 
experimenter who could not see where the food was placed because she had a bucket over her head.  The 
researchers take this as evidence that chimpanzees are unable to take the visual perspective of others.  In 
direct contrast to these findings however, Hare, Call, and Tomasello (2001), have found evidence that 
chimps can adjust their food searching behaviour in relation to whether or not a more dominant chimp has 
or has not seen where desirable food was hidden.  Specifically, when the dominant chimp has not seen the 
placement of the desirable food the subordinate chimp will retrieve that food but when the dominant chimp 
has seen the food placement the subordinate chimp will stay away from the food location.  Though 
researchers continue to debate about the theory of mind skills chimps may or may not have, there has yet to 
be any uncontroversial evidence of false belief understanding in this population.  
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argue from a subject’s failure on these tests to the conclusion that the subject fails to have 
the metarepresentational abilities the HOT theory requires. 
The rest of the argument is rather straightforward.  Since so many subjects fail 
these tests, and since failure on these tests is taken as evidence that these subjects lack 
what the HOT theory requires for basic state consciousness, objectors reason that HOT 
theorists are forced to conclude that those failing these tests are incapable of basic state 
consciousness.  Since this conclusion is taken to be counter-intuitive, the fact that the 
HOT theory leads to such a conclusion is counted as evidence that the HOT theory must 
be mistaken and should therefore be rejected as an explanation of basic state 
consciousness. 
This problem is not just a theoretical problem for the HOT theory; it also has 
some quite important consequences.  For example, philosophers argue that this problem 
has surprising implications for the issue of animal rights.
19
  If the objector is correct and 
TOM tests show that animals do not have the cognitive capacities required for basic state 
consciousness, then HOT theorist would be forced to say that animals cannot consciously 
experience suffering.  Hence the HOT theory would be calling into question the view that 
animals are sentient beings.  If animals are not sentient however, then their interests 
might no longer count in moral deliberation.
20
  Thus the HOT theory might entail not 
only that animals fail to have any state conscious mental states, but also that animals 
deserve no moral consideration.   
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 For example, see the exchange between Carruthers (1989, 2000) and Gennaro (1993, 1996, 2004). 
20
 Though Carruthers (1989) originally endorsed this sort of argument, he has since changed his mind.  
Carruthers (2000) now argues that moral concerns can be grounded in first-order desire frustration so 
higher-order thoughts and thus conscious desire frustration is no longer seen to be necessary. 
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Though I do not intend to follow up on this point here, notice that this issue is 
even more pressing once we expand the argument to include the young children and 
people with Autism Spectrum Disorders who also fail these TOM tests.  Since these 
populations also fail TOM tests, they also appear to lack the capacities the HOT theory 
requires, so they also would lack conscious suffering.  Thus the HOT theory might entail 
that children and people with Autism Spectrum Disorders are not owed moral 
consideration either.  Surely this is a consequence that HOT theorists should try to avoid, 
so the TOM objection really is a pressing concern. 
 Again then, the logic of the objection is as follows:  Since, according to the PR 
Assumption, the capacity to represent mental states in thought is necessary both for the 
formation of the HOTs required by the HOT theory for basic state consciousness and for 
a subject’s successful performance on standard verbal TOM tests, objectors believe that 
one’s performance on these tests can indicate whether or not one has the very capacities 
the HOT theory requires for basic state consciousness.  Since it turns out that so many 
subjects fail these TOM tests, HOT theorists seem forced to deny that these subjects are 
capable of having any state conscious mental states whatsoever.  Objectors find this 
conclusion counter-intuitive and instead argue that the fact that the HOT theory leads to 
such a conclusion is evidence that the theory must be mistaken.  The objectors thus take 
themselves to have shown that the HOT theory ought to be rejected as an explanation of 
state consciousness.   
With this understanding of the TOM objection to the HOT theory, let’s turn now 
to a discussion of the new non-verbal TOM tests and the argument in favour of the HOT 
theory that might be based on them. 
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3.3 New Non-verbal Theory of Mind Tests 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) used the violation-of-expectation paradigm (a 
paradigm based on the assumption that infants will look longer at surprising events) to 
test whether infants as young as 15 months would expect an actor to behave in accord 
with her false beliefs.  The experiment is set up similarly to the traditional Sally-Anne 
test, though the whole procedure is carried out nonverbally.  In the belief-induction 
phase, infants watch as an actor places a toy in one of two boxes.  The scenario then 
progresses in one of four ways, in order to induce in the actor either a true belief or a 
false belief about the toy’s location:  Either the toy changes locations while the actor 
watches (resulting in a true belief), or it changes locations while the actor does not watch 
(resulting in a false belief), or it remains in the same location while the actor watches 
(resulting in a true belief), or it changes locations while the actor watches and then 
changes back to the original location while the actor does not watch (resulting in a false 
belief).  The infants then receive the test trial, where their looking times are recorded as 
they watch the actor reach for the toy in one of the two locations.  Onishi and Baillargeon 
found that infants were always surprised (i.e., looked for significantly longer) when the 
actor failed to act in accord with her beliefs, regardless of whether those beliefs happened 
to be true or false.  As the authors write, “[t]hese results suggest that 15-month-old 
infants already possess (at least in a rudimentary and implicit form) a representational 
theory of mind: They realize that others act on the basis of their beliefs and that these 
beliefs are representations that may or may not mirror reality” (Onishi and Baillargeon 
(2005), p. 257).  
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Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) conducted a similar study in which a toddler 
and a confederate first watch as a toy is placed in one of two boxes then, while the 
confederate is distracted, the toy’s location changes.  Finally, a signal is presented, which 
indicates to the toddler that the confederate is about to search for the toy.  Using an 
anticipatory looking paradigm this time (which measures where subjects look in 
anticipation of the actor’s action, before the actor reaches for the toy), Southgate et al. 
measured the direction of the first eye saccade the infant made when the signal was 
presented as well as the amount of time the infant spent looking at the correct and 
incorrect locations in the brief pause between the signal and the actor’s action.  They also 
found statistically significant results, this time indicating that 2-year-olds looked first and 
looked for longer overall at the false-belief-target location.  As Southgate et al. write, 
their findings “strongly suggest that 25-month-old infants correctly attribute a false belief 
to another person and anticipate that person’s behaviour in accord with this false belief” 
(Southgate et al. (2007), p. 590). 
3.4 The Higher-Order Thought Theory’s Theory of Mind Argument Against the 
Theory of Mind Objection 
In light of this new evidence, an argument on behalf of the HOT theory might be 
formed that, in a way, mirrors the structure of the original TOM Objection.  Specifically, 
if HOT theorists were to adopt the PR Assumption themselves they could reason as 
follows:  Since, according to the PR Assumption, the capacity to represent mental states 
in thought is necessary both for successful performance on TOM tests as well as for the 
formation of the HOTs needed for basic state consciousness, an infant’s success on these 
new non-verbal TOM tests is evidence that these infants do have what it takes to have 
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basic state conscious mental states after all.  Since HOT theorists no longer must deny 
that infants are capable of having state conscious mental states, the HOT theory does not 
appear to have the sorts of counter-intuitive implications that the objector identifies, and 
hence there is no longer any reason to reject the theory.  
So here we see how philosophers on either side of the debate can use the TOM 
test evidence to support their differing arguments.  Proponents of the TOM objection can 
appeal to a subject’s failure on verbal TOM test as evidence that the subject does not 
have the capacities that the HOT theory requires, whereas proponents of the HOT theory 
can appeal to a subject’s success on nonverbal TOM tests as evidence that the subject 
does have the metarepresentational capacities the HOT theory requires for basic state 
consciousness.   
It’s also clear that, in taking a subject’s performance on TOM tests as evidence for 
either side, both sides of the debate must be making the same PR Assumption, namely, 
that the very same capacity to represent mental states in thought is necessary both for the 
formation of the thoughts the HOT theory requires for basic state consciousness and for 
successful performance on these TOM tests.  In holding the very same assumption, 
however, both sides are also vulnerable to the very same criticism.  Specifically, if it 
turns out that the PR Assumption is unwarranted, then both arguments will have to be 
rejected.  I believe this does turn out to be the case but, interestingly, that the PR 
Assumption fails in each case for different reasons.  In order to draw this out, we’ll have 
to determine the actual requirements for successful performance in each of the TOM test 
paradigms.  Let’s begin that discussion by identifying some of the important differences 
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between the two types of TOM tests, in order to draw out some facts that will help us in 
assessing what each paradigm really demands of its subjects. 
4. Some Differences Between the Verbal and Non-Verbal Theory of Mind Test 
Paradigms 
As noted, the key to my argument is an assessment of the actual requirements 
each sort of TOM test has for successful performance.  In order to properly identify those 
requirements, however, we must first identify a few important differences between these 
verbal and nonverbal TOM test paradigms. 
One obvious difference between the new nonverbal TOM tests and the standard 
verbal TOM tests is that the new tests do not involve any verbal communication.  
Specifically, in the new tests neither the narrative, nor the test questions, nor the subjects’ 
responses involve verbal behaviour, whereas in the Standard Sally-Anne test children are 
presented with a verbal narrative, are directly asked the test question (for example, 
‘Where will Sally look for her marble?’), and are encouraged (though not necessarily 
required) to respond verbally (for example, by saying, “in the basket”).
21
   
This shift is important because it eliminates verbal competence as a confounding 
factor in the success or failure of a child on the false belief task.  After all, the ages at 
which substantial development in TOM abilities seems to occur are the very same ages at 
which subjects are developing their ability to use language as well.  So, if a researcher’s 
only measure of TOM abilities relies on verbal competence, children might fail simply 
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 Though a verbal response may not always be required, explicit communicative behaviour is always 
required.  For example, Wimmer and Perner (1983) allow children simply to point to a location in response 
to verbal test questions about where the story character will search.  
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because they lack that competence rather than failing because they lack the capacity to 
represent mental states in thought.
22
 
Another important distinction between these tests was hinted at in Onishi and 
Baillargeon’s concluding remarks about their experiment.  Recall, they write that their 
“results suggest that 15-month-old infants already possess (at least in a rudimentary and 
implicit form) a representational theory of mind…” (Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), p. 
257, emphasis added).  As we see in this quote, there’s a tendency in the field to refer to 
the old standard tests as measures of an explicit knowledge of the mind and the new 
nonverbal tests as measures of an implicit understanding of the mind.  Though there’s 
little formal reflection on what these terms are meant to pick out in this field, the general 
consensus seems to be that the explicit knowledge is later to develop and it is conscious, 
reportable, and perhaps consciously controlled, whereas the implicit knowledge is earlier 
to develop and it is unconscious, nonverbalizable, and can influence behaviour without 
any conscious awareness of it doing so.
23
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 In fact, this is a central issue in debates over the true reason why subjects fail standard theory of mind 
tests.  Some researchers endorse Competence accounts of failure and argue that subjects fail TOM tests 
simply because they lack the knowledge of the mind the test is designed to measure. (For example, see 
Wellman (1991).  Note that Wellman suggests the shift in knowledge actually occurs between the ages of 2 
and 3 years old for typically developing children, rather than between 3 and 4 years old, since he found 
evidence that 3 year-olds can explain, though they cannot yet predict, other’s actions based on attributions 
of false-beliefs.  To keep our discussion as simple as possible however, I will continue to follow the 
majority in saying that the standard age that a shift is proposed to occur is between 3 and 4 years.)  On the 
other hand, some researchers endorse Performance accounts of failure and argue that TOM tests rely not 
only on a creature’s knowledge of the mind, but also on other aspects of cognition such as linguistic 
competence, executive control (a term which, roughly speaking, covers the many cognitive functions that 
allow a creature to plan and initiate goal-directed behaviour), and the ability to handle sufficient 
computational complexity.  Those on this side of the debate argue that a breakdown in any of these other 
areas would prevent a subject from performing successfully on TOM tests, even if she had the knowledge 
the test requires.  (For example, see Fodor (1992).)  A member of this camp would likely raise the worry 
introduced in the text.   
23
 To see further support for this assessment of the field, consider the following quotes from researchers 
actively engaged in studying infants’ TOM abilities: “Appealing to implicit knowledge when infants show 
correct looking is, in fact, a very popular option in the infancy field…Yet there is typically no attempt to 
define what is meant by the term “implicit” except “earlier developing” (Ruffman et al. (2001), p. 202); 
“The distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge plays an important role not only in cognitive 
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This way of understanding the distinction between an implicit understanding of 
the mind and an explicit knowledge of the mind is apparent, for example, in a study by 
Ruffman, Garnham, Import, and Connolly (2001).  These researchers set out to 
investigate whether the anticipatory eye gaze measure, which was subsequently used by 
Southgate et al. (2007), taps into an implicit understanding rather than an explicit 
knowledge of the mind by testing whether or not children are conscious of the 
information that their eye gaze expresses.  Since the findings of this experiment can, in 
addition to drawing out this distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, also 
help us in identifying some of the differing demands of the two sorts of TOM tests, we’ll 
take a moment to discuss some of the details of this experiment here. 
To measure whether a child is or is not conscious of the information expressed by 
her eye gaze, Ruffman et al. (2001) use a betting protocol wherein children are asked to 
bet, by placing differing amounts of counters, on each of the predictions they make 
throughout the experiment.  The experimenters argue that the betting forces a subject to 
measure her certainty in her own answer and that the task of assessing one’s own 
certainty is a task that requires conscious processing.
 
  The same is true, they note, when 
subjects are asked to answer verbal questions; conscious processing is also required.  
Furthermore, and unsurprisingly, the information that a subject consciously processes 
must itself be made conscious in order to be processed consciously.  So, for example, a 
subject’s predictions and assessments of her confidence in those predictions both would 
need to be conscious in order for her to place bets on her predictions.  Or, similarly, a 
subject’s thought about where Sally believes her marble to be would need to be a 
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development but in cognitive science at large, despite the fact that no agreed meaning of this distinction has 
yet emerged.  Our use is primarily descriptive and intuitive” (Clements and Perner (1994), p. 377). 
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conscious thought in order for the subject to reply to verbal questions about Sally’s 
belief.  So the experimenters reason that by using this betting protocol and by assessing 
whether or not a subject’s eye gaze behaviour matches up with her betting behaviour, 
they can discover whether the information expressed by a subject’s eye gaze plays a role 
in the bets she places.  In this way the researchers believe they can determine whether the 
information expressed by a subject’s eye gaze is conscious and explicit or is unconscious 
and implicit.
24
 
Before testing theory of mind knowledge, however, Ruffman et al. first had to 
ensure that the betting procedure would measure even slight shifts in a child’s confidence 
in her answers.  To determine whether this was the case, Ruffman et al. included two 
important control conditions in their experiment.  In both of these control conditions 
children were presented with an apparatus consisting of two slides.  One slide was red 
and would allow only red squares to slide down, the other was green and would allow 
only green balls to slide down.  Children were then shown a bag with some amount of red 
squares and/or green balls and were asked to predict which of the two slides an object 
from the bag would emerge from.  They were also asked to bet on their predictions. 
In one of these control conditions the bag contained only red squares.  In this case, 
the correct answer would be to predict that an object from the bag would come out of the 
red slide.  Furthermore, given the certainty of the outcome, it was predicted that children 
should bet on their answer with confidence.  In the second control scenario the bag 
contains nine red squares and one green ball, thus introducing a slight shift in the 
probability that an answer of ‘red slide’ is correct.  The researchers reasoned that, if the 
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 Since the points discussed here are relatively central to my argument, I direct those interested in 
following up on these points to Ruffman et al. (2001), p. 203. 
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betting procedure is a subtle measure of confidence, then this shift in probability should 
be reflected in the children’s betting behaviour as well, since the children can no longer 
be certain that their answer of ‘red slide’ is correct.   
Indeed subjects did show this pattern of betting responses.  When presented the 
bag of only red objects, the children placed a mean of nine to ten of their total of ten 
counters at the dominant (red) location, indicating that the children bet confidently on 
their predictions.  On the other hand, when presented the bag of nine red objects and one 
green object children only bet a mean of five to six of their ten counters at the dominant 
(red) location, indicating that the children adjusted their bets significantly to reflect even 
this slight drop in confidence in their predictions.
25
  From this evidence the researchers 
concluded that the betting procedure was in fact a subtle measure of even slight shifts in 
confidence.   
Having established that the betting measure was sensitive enough to detect even 
slight shifts in confidence, the researchers then presented their subjects – typically 
developing 3-5 yr olds – with a false belief task similar to the Sally-Anne test.  Once 
again, children are introduced to a character, Ed, who has a toy that he places in one of 
two locations.  He then leaves the scene to take a nap while another character, Katy, 
enters the scene and moves the toy to the other of the two locations.  Katy then leaves the 
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 In addition to these controls, experimenters also ran an ambiguous condition task, to rule out the 
possibility that children were just matching their bets to the proportions of red or green objects in the bag.  
In this ambiguous condition, there was only one object in the bag but children could not see it; instead they 
were just told that it could be red or it could be green.  Ruffman et al. (2001) reasoned that if children were 
just matching bets to objects then they would bet with greater confidence on whichever colour slide they 
guessed the object to be affiliated with, whereas if they were betting based on actual confidence in their 
answers they would spilt their bets between the two sides.  Researcher found that subjects “were 
significantly more likely to spread their [betting] counters at more than one location in the ambiguous task 
relative to the 10-0 [task]. … Children’s tendency to spread their counters in the ambiguous task and not 
spread them in the 10-0 [task]…is consistent with the idea that their betting on all tasks is based on 
certainty about probabilities” Ruffman et al. (2001), p. 214. 
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scene as well.  Ed then wakes up and wants to play with his toy so he re-enters the scene.  
At this point, the experimenter wonders aloud where Ed will look for his toy and the 
children’s anticipatory eye gaze is measured.  Finally, the children are asked directly 
where they think Ed will look for his toy and they are also asked to bet on their 
predictions by placing their counters next to one or both of the possible search locations. 
Interestingly, Ruffman et al. found that some children initially look at the correct 
location (where Ed falsely believes the toy to be) but subsequently answer the verbal 
question incorrectly (by saying Ed will search where the toy is now actually located), 
replicating the findings of Clements and Perner (1994) that there is a stage in 
development where children’s performance is split between the eye gaze and the verbal 
response measures.  Even more interestingly however, Ruffman et al. also found that the 
youngest children who show this pattern of split responding (mean age of 3.4 years) do 
not seem to be conscious of the understanding of the mind that is conveyed by their 
correct anticipatory looking behaviour.  This fact was evidenced by the failure of these 
young split-responders to take into account the knowledge expressed by their (correct) 
eye gaze when assessing their confidence in their (incorrect) verbal responses.
26
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 The following is a summary of the full results of this study:  The researchers first focused their analysis 
on only those children who passed the eye gaze measure.  They then split that group of eye gaze passers 
into four smaller groups.  First they separated those children who passed the eye gaze measure but failed 
the explicit (verbal and betting) measures from those who passed all measures.  Then they separated each of 
these groups in half to get a group of younger children and older children within each group.  So they end 
up with four comparison groups: younger children who pass eye gaze but fail explicit measures (mean age 
3.40 years), older children who pass eye gaze but fail explicit measures (mean age 4.09 years), younger 
passers of both measures (mean age 3.59 years) and older passers of both measures (mean age 4.46 years).  
All groups bet with significantly less confidence in the 9:1 task than the 10:0 task, indicating they were all 
sensitive to shifts in confidence.  The rest of the results breakdown as follows:  Older split-responders bet 
on their (incorrect) verbal reply to the false belief task with significantly less confidence than their bets in 
the 10:0 scenario (showing that they did (consciously) register some uncertainty about their reply) but with 
significantly more confidence than their bets in the 9:1 scenario (showing that the shift in confidence was 
less than the shift induced by the 9:1 scenario).  Younger children who passed both measures bet on their 
(correct) verbal reply to the false belief task with significantly less confidence than their bets in the 10:0 
scenario (showing that they too (consciously) registered some uncertainty about their reply) but showed no 
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To explain this conclusion a little further, researchers found that, despite looking 
to the correct location, these young split-responders bet just as confidently on their 
incorrect verbal reply as they did when they were betting in the control scenarios where 
the outcome was guaranteed (i.e., the 10 red:0 green scenarios).  These young split-
responders also showed significantly more confidence in their incorrect verbal reply than 
they did when betting on the control scenarios where the outcome was slightly less than 
guaranteed (the 9 red:1 green scenarios).
27
  Since the shift in betting behaviour measured 
in these 9:1 control scenarios demonstrates that these children can be sensitive to even 
subtle changes in their own confidence, and since the youngest children showing these 
split responses do not show a similar shift in confidence when betting on their incorrect 
verbal responses to the Sally-Anne-style task, Ruffman et al. conclude that the 
understanding of the mind expressed by these children’s correct eye gaze responses must 
not be a conscious understanding, or else it would influence the subjects’ betting 
behaviour.  Hence the researchers conclude that the eye gaze measure is actually 
measuring an unconscious and implicit understanding of the mind in these young 
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significant difference in betting relative to the 9:1 scenario (showing the shift in confidence was 
comparable to the one induced in the 9:1 scenario). This group was the least confident in their false-belief 
answers.  Finally, older children who passed both measures showed no significant difference between their 
betting on their (correct) verbal reply to the false belief task and their bets in the 10:0 scenario (showing a 
similar certainty in both answers), but bet on their (correct) verbal reply to the false belief task with 
significantly more confidence than their bets in the 9:1 scenario (showing, again that they were relatively 
certain about their reply in the false-belief task). (Note, the researchers report in the text that the older 
passers “were more certain [in their false-belief answers] than on the 9-1 task” (Ruffman et al, (2001), p. 
211) and this statement is similar to the statements they made when reporting other statistically significant 
results.  That being said, the researchers do not report the difference in betting here as statistically 
significant in one of the tables summarizing their data. I assume this was an oversight on their part but I 
mention this fact for the reader.) 
27
 More specifically, 94% of these young split responders bet all their counters on the (incorrect) location 
identified with their verbal reply, despite looking at the correct location initially.  On the other hand, 83% 
of these young split responders showed a sensitivity to shifts in confidence by betting at least some 
counters on the non-dominant (green) location in the 9 red:1 green control scenario. 
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children.
28
  On the other hand, since conscious processing is required both in order to bet 
on one’s predictions and in order to reply to verbal questioning, the researchers argue that 
the knowledge of the mind that is conveyed by these other measures must be both 
conscious and explicit. 
Adding this lesson to the one identified earlier, we’ve now learned that the two 
types of TOM tests have the following differences:  Standard Tom tests are primarily 
verbal and they tap into a subject’s explicit, and therefore conscious, knowledge of the 
mind.  On the other hand, nonverbal TOM tests are not reliant on a subject’s verbal 
abilities and they tap a subject’s implicit, and therefore unconscious, understanding of the 
mind.  Here we see then, that there are clearly some significant differences between these 
tests, and hence we can expect the requirements for success on each test to differ 
significantly as well.  Let’s now turn to an analysis of those requirements and an 
assessment of whether the PR Assumption is justified in relation to either test paradigm.   
5. The Requirements for Success on Theory of Mind Tests and the Fate of the 
Parallel Requirements Assumption 
To tease out the demands that these TOM tests place on their subjects we will 
focus on the representational structure of the mental states that a subject must form if she 
is to be successful on the test.  Again, by ‘representational structure’ I mean to identify 
the level or order of representation that a particular mental state involves.  For example, 
first-order mental states are representations of non-mental objects or facts in the world, 
second-order mental states are representations of first-order mental states, and so forth.   
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
28
 As Ruffman et al. write, “[o]ur finding that younger failers were more certain on the false belief task than 
on the 9-1 task is consistent with the idea that despite looking to the [correct] left-hand location, such 
children are not conscious that the story character might return there,” (Ruffman et al. (2001), p. 211). 
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The reason for focusing on the representational structure of the thoughts required 
by these tests should be quite clear: Both arguments are based on the PR Assumption that 
the capacity to represent mental states in thought is both necessary for successful 
performance on TOM tests and necessary for the formation of the HOTs required by the 
HOT theory for basic state consciousness.  The target of these arguments is the HOT 
theory’s account of basic state consciousness.  As we learned earlier, the HOT theory 
says that what is required for basic state consciousness is the formation of an unconscious 
appropriate second-order thought (about oneself as being in a particular first-order state).  
Hence the capacity that is required by the HOT theory for basic state consciousness is 
precisely the capacity to form these second-order thoughts.  In order for the PR 
Assumption to be justified then, it must be the case that successful performance on TOM 
tests also requires precisely the same capacity to form second-order thoughts.  So, by 
investigating the representational structure of the thoughts required for success on each of 
these TOM tests, we can thereby assess the soundness of the PR Assumption and 
determine whether either of the two arguments should be accepted.  To that end, let’s 
now look at the demands of each of the two types of TOM tests in turn. 
5.1 The Demands of the Verbal False Belief Task 
I refer the reader to Table 1, which outlines the representational structure of 
various schematically depicted thoughts that we will be discussing throughout this 
analysis.   
To begin, notice that the first row represents the belief formed by the fictional 
character, Sally, in the Sally-Anne tests.  Sally believes that the marble is in the basket.   
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Table 1. The representational structure of thoughts relevant to the verbal false belief 
task. 
 Mental State in 
Question 
Schematic of Representation Order of 
Representational 
Structure 
1 Sally’s Belief B <that the marble is in the basket> 1st 
2 Subject’s 
Representation 
of Sally’s Belief 
T < Sally Believes <that the marble is in 
the basket> > 
2nd 
3 HOT Required 
for Basic State 
Consciousness 
T < I Believe <that all people are 
equal> > 
2nd 
4 Thought 
Required for 
Successful 
Performance on 
(Explicit) Verbal 
TOM Test 
T < I Think < that Sally Believes <that 
the marble is in the basket> > > 
3rd 
5 HOT Required 
for Introspective 
State 
Consciousness 
T < I Think < that I Believe <that all 
people are equal> > > 
 
3rd 
 
As we can see, Sally’s belief has a first-order representational structure because it 
represents non-mental items and facts, it does not represent any other mental states.   
Researchers believe that subjects of the verbal false-belief test must represent 
Sally’s belief in order to pass the test, perhaps by forming a thought as represented in the 
second row of Table 1, namely, the thought that Sally believes that the marble is in the 
basket.  This thought clearly has a second-order representational structure because it is a 
thought about another mental state (Sally’s belief).   
Notice that this thought obviously is not the kind of second-order thought that 
would enable state consciousness of any kind, as it fails to meet at least one of 
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Rosenthal’s conditions on the appropriateness of HOTs, namely, that appropriate HOTs 
must be representations of oneself as being in a particular mental state.  Hence, as one 
would expect, the HOT theory does not predict that, in forming a thought like the one in 
row 2, a subject will come to have Sally’s belief state consciously.   
In the third row we see represented a HOT that, if formed appropriately, would 
provide for basic state consciousness.  Since this thought is a representation of another 
mental representation (one’s first-order belief that all people are equal), this thought also 
has a second-order representational structure.   
Once we compare the thoughts in rows 2 and 3, we see the similarity in 
representational structure that seems to ground the PR Assumption.  If a thought like the 
one is row 2 is all that’s required for successful performance on these tests, and if the 
representational structure of this thought does mirror the representational structure of the 
HOTs required for basic state consciousness, then these tests would seem to measure the 
very capacity to represent mental states in thought that the HOT theory requires for basic 
state consciousness.  The question now is whether a thought like the one is row 2 is all 
that’s required for successful performance on these tests. 
We learned from the Ruffman et al. (2001) study that these verbal tests tap into a 
subject’s explicit knowledge and that answering verbal questions is a task that requires 
the subject to engage in conscious processing.  Both of these facts entail that the subject’s 
knowledge of Sally’s belief must be knowledge of which the subject is conscious.  
Furthermore, as we learned from the Phenomenal Character Principle, the HOT theory 
dictates that a person only comes to be conscious of what her mental states represent 
when those mental states themselves are represented by appropriate HOTs.  Putting these 
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pieces together, since a subject must be conscious of what she thinks about Sally’s belief, 
and since a subject can only be conscious of what she thinks if her thought itself is state 
conscious, we can see that, according to the HOT theory, a subject actually would need to 
form a further HOT about her thought about Sally’s belief in order to respond to the 
verbal questions and pass these tests successfully.  Such a thought is represented in row 
4.  
Now this point is important:  Notice that this thought in row 4, the thought that a 
subject actually must form in order to pass the verbal Sally-Anne test, is a thought that 
has a third-order representational structure.  In forming this thought the subject is 
representing both Sally’s belief as well as the subject’s own thought that Sally has that 
belief, hence the subject is actually forced to do something structurally more complex 
that what HOT theory requires for basic state consciousness.   
From here we can draw two conclusions:  First, we can conclude that the PR 
Assumption is actually unjustified in this case.  Since these verbal TOM tests require 
more of a subject than the mere formation of a second-order thought, they require more 
than the HOT theory requires for basic state consciousness.  Hence there is no parallel in 
requirements in these cases.  This means that a subject’s failure on these verbal TOM 
tests cannot indicate that the subject lacks the minimal capacity to represent mental states 
in thought that HOT theory requires for basic state consciousness, and so the objection 
fails. 
Second, since the thought actually required for success on these verbal TOM tests 
is structurally similar to the thoughts required for introspective state consciousness 
(compare rows 4 and 5 in Table 1 for example), one might be tempted to save the 
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objection by arguing that a subject’s failure on these tests instead indicates that the 
subject lacks the mental capacities necessary for introspective state consciousness and 
hence provides us with a new reason to reject the HOT theory.  I think this new argument 
would be too quick though. 
The original objection claimed that the HOT theory was forced toward a counter-
intuitive conclusion, namely, that typically developing humans beyond the age of 4 are 
essentially the only creatures on earth who have any conscious mental states whatsoever.  
It was the counter-intuitiveness of this conclusion that provided the force to reject the 
HOT theory.  According to the new version of the objection though, the conclusion HOT 
theorists might be forced to draw is as follows: Typically developing humans beyond the 
age of 4 are essentially the only creatures on earth capable of introspective state 
consciousness.  The problem is that this conclusion is not as likely to be deemed counter-
intuitive any more.  Furthermore, if we do find that the majority’s intuitions are not in 
conflict with this conclusion (as I suspect that we will), then there would no longer be any 
impetus to reject the HOT theory.  So, because the TOM Objection relies on the counter-
intuitiveness of the claims HOT theory is forced to make, and because this new claim 
does not seem to be as likely to be deemed counter-intuitive, it would appear that the 
TOM Objection could not be saved by repurposing it as an argument about introspective 
state consciousness. This is our second conclusion.   
To summarize, successful performance on verbal TOM tests actually requires a 
subject to form thoughts with a third-order representational structure, which mirrors the 
structure of the HOTs required for introspective but not basic state consciousness.  In 
light of this fact, we must conclude that the PR Assumption fails to be warranted and that 
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a subject’s failure on verbal TOM tests should not be taken as evidence that the subject 
lacks the ability to form the second-order representations the HOT theory requires for 
basic state consciousness.  Since it was only the claim that very few creatures were 
capable of basic state consciousness that seemed to be counterintuitive, the wide-spread 
failure of essentially all but typically developing humans older than 4 years on these tests 
can no longer be taken as evidence against the HOT theory.  Hence, the TOM objection 
can be rejected.
29
 
5.2 The Demands of the Non-Verbal False Belief Task 
Let us now assess the demands that the nonverbal TOM tests place on their 
subjects and ask whether the PR Assumption might be warranted in the HOT theorist’s 
own TOM argument against the TOM objection.  This time I refer the reader to Table 2, 
which again outlines the representational structure of various thoughts that we will 
discuss throughout this analysis.   
As shown in row 1 of Table 2, the actor in these nonverbal TOM tests will form a 
belief about the toy’s location, just as Sally formed a belief about her marble’s location in 
the verbal Sally-Anne test.  The belief formed by the actor here will also have a first-
order representational structure because it is a representation of non-mental items and 
facts, not a representation of any other mental states.    
Though researchers are in less agreement here (as we’ll discuss shortly), let’s first 
assume that successful performance on these nonverbal TOM tests also requires that an 
infant represent the actor’s belief about where the toy is located.  Under this assumption 
we see that, as was the case with the verbal TOM tests, the subject would need to form a 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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 Note that the success of subjects on these verbal TOM tests would appear to be a clear indication that 
subjects do have what it takes (and more) to have basic state consciousness.  I note this point for the reader 
but, as it does not relate to any of the arguments we are assessing, I will discuss it no further here. 
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Table 2. The representational structure of thoughts relevant to the non-verbal false belief 
task. 
 Mental State in 
Question 
Schematic of Representation Order of 
Representational 
Structure 
1 Actor’s Belief B <that the toy is in the green box> 1st 
2  Thought Possibly 
Required for Successful 
Performance on 
(Implicit) Nonverbal 
TOM Test 
T < Actor Believes <that the toy is in 
the green box> > 
 
2nd 
3 HOT Required for 
Basic State 
Consciousness 
T < I Believe <that all people are 
equal> > 
2nd 
4 Thought Possibly 
Required for Successful 
Performance on 
(Implicit) Nonverbal 
TOM Test 
T <Actor + Toy + Green Box> 
 
1st 
 
thought like the one in row 2 if she is to perform successfully.  This thought has a 
second-order representational structure, since it is a thought about another mental state 
(the actor’s belief).   
In the third row we see a representation of a HOT that, if formed appropriately, 
would provide for basic state consciousness.  Since this thought is also about another 
mental state (one’s first order belief that all people are equal), this thought also has a 
second-order representational structure.  And so again we see that the representational 
structure of the subject’s thought about the actor’s belief (as shown in row 2) is similar to 
the representational structure of the HOT that would afford basic state consciousness (as 
shown in row 3), and hence we see why one might be tempted to adopt the PR 
Assumption.  If a thought like the one in row 2 is all that is required for successful 
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performance on these nonverbal TOM tests and if these thoughts have the same second-
order representational structure as the thoughts required for basic state consciousness, 
then these tests would appear to measure precisely the capacity to represent mental states 
in thought that the HOT theory requires for basic state consciousness.  
Now, it was at this stage in our assessment of the verbal TOM tests that we were 
forced to reject the PR Assumption, because we learned from Ruffman et al. (2001) that 
subjects needed to be conscious of what they thought about Sally’s belief in order to pass 
those tests.  In regards to these nonverbal TOM tests, however, the lesson from the 
Ruffman et al. study is quite different.   
Recall, Ruffman et al. found that subjects could succeed on nonverbal TOM tests, 
by correctly looking to the location where someone will search for an object, without 
showing any evidence that they were conscious of the understanding of the mind that was 
expressed by their correct eye gaze behaviour.  (Again, this was the lesson Ruffman et al. 
drew from the fact that the youngest split-responders failed to take into account the 
information expressed by their correct looking behaviour when betting on their incorrect 
verbal responses.)  Since a subject’s eye gaze was found to be measuring an implicit 
understanding of the mind in these cases, there would be no need for subjects in these 
nonverbal TOM tests to form further third-order thoughts in order to make their second-
order representations of the actor’s belief state conscious.  So, in distinction from our 
conclusion about the standard verbal TOM tests, if a subject does need to represent the 
actor’s belief in order to succeed on these nonverbal TOM tests, then that subject need 
only form a thought with a second-order representational structure (like the one 
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represented in row 2), in order to correctly anticipate the actor’s searching and 
demonstrate this expectation with her eye gaze.  
So far there are two interesting points to note here:  First, it appears that, at this 
stage in our assessment at least, we are not yet forced to give up the PR Assumption.  
Since subjects in nonverbal TOM tests do not need to be conscious of the information 
tapped by the eye gaze measures in order to perform successfully on these tests, the 
formation of second-order thoughts about the actor’s belief may be all that’s required for 
successful performance.  Since the second-order representational structure of these 
thoughts is parallel to the second-order representational structure of the HOTs required 
for basic state consciousness, the PR Assumption is not threatened.   
Second, our earlier discussion of the HOT theory might actually provide an 
explanation of why successful performance is possible in these cases.  Recall, we learned 
from the Awareness Principle that the formation of an unconscious mental state can 
enable a person to be differentially responsive to what that state represents, despite the 
fact that the person is not conscious of what she is representing.  This was the accepted 
explanation of how blindsight patients perform successfully on forced-choice tests, for 
example, and this account seems to work just as well for explaining the performance of 
infants on these nonverbal TOM tests.  Specifically, despite the fact that the infant is not 
conscious of what she thinks about the actor’s belief in these cases, insofar as the infant 
does represent the actor’s belief, the infant will be afforded an awareness of the actor’s 
belief and so this unconscious representation will enable the infant to respond 
differentially on the basis of what she represents the actor to be believing.  
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Before celebrating any victories here, however, recall that our assessment so far is 
also based on a second assumption, namely, that an infant’s successful performance in 
these nonverbal TOM tests does require, in the first place, that the infant represent the 
actor’s belief about where the toy is located.  As I mentioned when introducing this 
assumption, however, researchers are far from agreeing on this issue.  In fact, there are 
numerous competing explanations of how infants achieve their success on nonverbal 
TOM tests, some of which appeal to mental state attribution but some of which do not 
require that an infant represent any mental states at all.  If it turns out that infants can pass 
nonverbal TOM tests without representing any mental states at all, then we would no 
longer be justified in taking an infant’s success on these tests as indicative of the infant’s 
having the capacity to represent mental states in thought that the HOT theory requires.  
Hence the PR Assumption once again would have to be rejected.   
Since we’ve just seen an account of how infants might perform successfully if 
they were attributing mental states to the actor, let’s now consider an account of 
successful performance that does not require subjects to attribute mental states to the 
actor.  Such an account is provided, for example, by Perner and Ruffman (2005). 
Perner and Ruffman argue that infants can pass these nonverbal tests by applying 
a simple behavioural rule, such as ‘agents tend to search for things in the last place they 
saw them located’.  Perner and Ruffman argue that, though such a rule might only work 
because agents have minds and because certain mental states are causally connected with 
certain behaviours, it is possible for infants to formulate and make use of such rules, 
perhaps, for example, by initially extracting such rules from behavioural regularities, 
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without yet knowing anything about the mind or the causal connections between one’s 
mind and one’s behaviour.
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To explain, for example, how an infant might make use of a rule about ‘seeing’ 
without having any conception of mental states, Perner and Ruffman suggest that the 
infants instead simply might form “three-way actor-object-location associations” (Perner 
and Ruffman (2005), p. 215).  They explain these associations as patterns of neuron 
firings (or, more simply, as representations) that encode united information about the 
actor, the search object, and the last location at which the actor had unobstructed eye 
contact with the object.  So rather than requiring an infant to represent the actor’s 
perceptual states or beliefs, the infant instead need only represent this connection between 
non-mental facts and objects.  To put this in the terminology we have been using then, 
these sorts of representations would only have a first-order representational structure, 
since they are representations of non-mental facts and objects rather than representations 
of other mental states.  An example of such a thought is presented in row 4 of Table 2.   
Furthermore, once an infant forms such a three-way association, Perner and 
Ruffman argue that the representation can support the very same expectations of 
behaviour that were, on the competing account, taken to be supported by attributions of 
mental states.  For example, if an infant forms a representation associating the actor, the 
toy, and the green box location, and does not form a representation associating the actor, 
the toy, and the yellow box location (perhaps because the actor’s eyes were never 
directed toward the toy when it was located at the yellow box), then the infant has the 
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 For example, Perner and Ruffman write, “such a rule captures something implicit about the mind, 
because the rule only applies as a result of the mind mediating between seeing and acting.  Nonetheless, 
infants can simply know the rule without any conception that the mind is the mediator” (Perner and 
Ruffman (2005), p. 215). 
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foundation for an expectation that the actor will search for the toy in the green box 
location.   
Notice also that this expectation will then be able to generate the very same 
looking time results as were found in both of the nonverbal TOM experiments.  In regard 
to the Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) study, since the infant expects the actor to search in 
the green box location (because the green box is represented in her three-way 
association), the infant would be surprised, and hence would look for longer, if the actor 
instead searched in the yellow box location.  In regard to the Southgate et al. (2007) 
study, since the infant expects the actor to search in the green box location (because the 
green box is represented in her three-way association), the infant would likely look first 
and for longer overall at the green box location when the searching signal is sounded.  
Hence we see that the very same performance, which is based on the very same 
predictions of behaviour, can be grounded by these first-order three-way associations, 
without requiring that the infant represent any mental states at all.  Furthermore, it’s 
interesting to note that the authors of both studies actually mention this very rule and 
agree that their data could be sufficiently explained by an account such as this one.
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In both cases then, the very same data can be neatly explained by appeal to an 
infant’s ability to track physical and behavioural data; we do not also need to suppose that 
an infant represents any of the actor’s mental states.  Furthermore, as we learned from the 
Ruffman et al (2001) study, infants would not need to be conscious of the information 
grounding their responses in these cases either, so it would not even be the case that they 
would have to make their own three-way-associations conscious by making them the 
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objects of higher-order thoughts.  Hence in no way at all would this explanation require 
any sort of second-order representations.   
In this way, we see how a purely behavioural rule (such as ‘agents search for 
objects at the location where they last had unobstructed eye contact with that object’) 
would account for the expectations and the varying looking times measured in these 
experiments, all the while not requiring that an infant attribute any sort of mental states to 
the actor or be able to represent mental states in thought at all.  If this sort of explanation 
were accepted and we were to conclude that successful performance on nonverbal TOM 
tests does not require the formation of any second-order thoughts whatsoever, then the 
PR Assumption would have to be rejected.  We would no longer be justified in taking 
success on nonverbal TOM tests as evidence that infants do have the very capacity to 
represent mental states in thought that the HOT theory requires for basic state 
consciousness and so the HOT theorists’ own argument against the TOM objection would 
have to be rejected.  
 So, here we have two different ways of explaining the nonverbal TOM test data.  
According to one explanation infants do represent the mental states of others in order to 
make inferences about the other’s future behaviour but, according to the other, infants 
need only represent non-mental facts about the relationship of people to objects and their 
environment in order make these inferences.  Given that both explanations are just as 
successful at explaining the data, it would appear that the data themselves do not lend 
unique support to either interpretation.  Hence the data cannot help us in determining 
whether the PR Assumption is warranted in these cases.   
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In light of this fact it would appear that the most conservative conclusion to draw 
would be to say that the PR Assumption is not clearly true and thus that we are not 
warranted in adopting it at this time.  Since we are not safe in assuming that successful 
performance on nonverbal TOM test requires a subject to form a second-order thought, 
we cannot take these tests as indications of whether or not a creature has the 
metarepresentational capacities the HOT theory requires for basic state consciousness.  
Thus we come to the, perhaps tentative, conclusion that a subject’s success on non-verbal 
TOM tests provides no clear evidence in support of the HOT theory.
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5. Conclusion 
I have argued that both sides of this debate rely on the same false assumption, 
namely, that TOM tests require for success the same capacities the HOT theory requires 
for basic state consciousness.  To support this conclusion I first demonstrated that this PR 
Assumption was necessary if either side was to argue that evidence from TOM tests has 
any bearing on the HOT theory in the first place.  I then demonstrated that, in relation to 
the verbal TOM tests on which the TOM objection is based, the PR Assumption must be 
false because these tests require subjects to form third-order thoughts in order to be 
successful.  If this analysis is sound then objectors cannot appeal to the failure of subjects 
on these verbal TOM tests as indications that the subjects lack what the HOT theory 
requires for basic state consciousness.  Hence the TOM objection was defeated. 
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 Interestingly, even if we did assume that these nonverbal tests really do track the metarepresentational 
capacities the HOT theory requires for basic state consciousness, it turns out that there are still groups of 
people who fail even these non-verbal TOM tests yet, presumably, these people still have conscious mental 
states.  For example, in a study identical to the one run by Southgate et al. (2007), Senju et al. (2010) found 
that children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) failed to look in anticipation at the locations 
predicted by attributing false beliefs.  Instead their performance was no different from chance.  As the 
researchers write, “…children with ASD…fail to spontaneously anticipate others’ actions when such 
anticipation requires the attribution of a false belief to the actor” (Senju et al., 2010, p. 359).  Thus, even if 
we take the PR Assumption to be justified relative to these tests, the TOM objection still might not be 
defeated.  
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I then demonstrated that, in relation to the nonverbal TOM tests on which the 
HOT theorists’ own argument against the TOM objection is based, the PR Assumption 
must be rejected, at least for now, be rejected because it is currently unclear whether 
these tests require subjects to form second-order thoughts or merely first-order thoughts 
in order to be successful.  If this analysis is sound then proponents of the HOT theory 
cannot appeal to the success of subjects on these nonverbal TOM tests as indications that 
the subjects do have the metarepresentational capacities the HOT theory requires for 
basic state consciousness.  Hence the HOT theorists’ own argument against the TOM 
objection must also be rejected. 
In sum, current TOM tests cannot be taken as measures of the capacity to 
represent mental states in thought that the HOT theory requires for basic state 
consciousness.  The PR Assumption therefore must be rejected and so the arguments 
discussed herein, the TOM Objection and the HOT theorists’ argument against the TOM 
objection, both must be rejected.  
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Paper 2: Why the Higher-Order Thought Theory Cannot Claim that Basic 
State Consciousness Involves Higher-Order Phenomenal Character 
  
1. Introduction 
Robert Lurz (2003, 2006) convincingly argues that the phenomenal character 
affiliated with basic state consciousness does not necessarily involve one’s becoming 
higher-order conscious of the fact that one has a particular mental state.  I will call this 
Lurz’s ‘Phenomenal Character Argument’.  Beyond merely establishing this fact 
however, Lurz believes his Phenomenal Character Argument also provides good reason 
to reject the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness.  Since Lurz takes 
HOT theorists to claim that the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state 
consciousness does necessarily involve one’s becoming higher-order conscious of the 
fact that one has a particular state, and since his Phenomenal Character Argument shows 
this not to be the case, Lurz takes his argument to show that the HOT theory fails to 
accurately account for phenomenal character and hence that the theory can be rejected.  
I will argue that Lurz’s interpretation of the account of phenomenal character 
provided by the HOT theory is incorrect and hence that his argument against the HOT 
theory fails.  In fact, I argue that the HOT theory cannot provide the characterization of 
phenomenal character that Lurz interprets it to be providing, since the HOT theory cannot 
say that the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness involves one’s 
becoming conscious of what one’s (unconscious) HOTs represent. 
I also have a few peripheral goals in this paper.  In presenting the argument 
outlined above, I hope to draw attention to a fact about the HOT theory that appears to go 
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unnoticed, namely, that there is an important distinction between the HOT theory’s 
account of what grounds state consciousness and the HOT theory’s account of what it’s 
like to have state conscious states.  I contend that only the former account can be 
provided in terms of higher-order representation, so the HOT theory’s two accounts must 
be importantly distinct. 
Finally, I hope that this paper will initiate a serious philosophical conversation 
about the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character.  There is currently very limited 
discussion of this aspect of the HOT theory and, though I believe the interpretation I offer 
here is sound, I present this paper as a call to those in support of, and those against, the 
HOT theory to join in this discussion. 
The paper will proceed as follows:  Since one aim of this paper is to spark a 
conversation about the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character, I begin by 
identifying some of my assumptions and by clarifying some of the terminology with 
which the issues in this paper will be discussed.  The aim is to make clear any details that 
may bring confusion to the debate.  I then briefly outline the relevant aspects of the HOT 
theory, focusing solely on David Rosenthal’s (2002a, 2002b, 2005) version of the theory 
since Lurz himself specifically targets Rosenthal’s account.  Next I present Lurz’s 
interpretation of the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character and I present Lurz’s 
Phenomenal Character Argument against the HOT theory.  I then explain why HOT 
theorists cannot be explaining the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state 
consciousness in the way Lurz understands them to be explaining it and hence I 
demonstrate that Lurz’s interpretation must be incorrect.  I conclude that we can therefore 
reject Lurz’s Phenomenal Character Argument against the HOT theory.  Finally, I discuss 
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the implications of my argument for the separation of the HOT theory’s accounts of what 
state consciousness consists in and of what it’s like to have state conscious states, and I 
briefly sketch an alternative interpretation of the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal 
character, providing textual support for this new account. 
2. Setting the Terms of the Debate 
Since I hope this paper will initiate a philosophical discussion of the HOT 
theory’s account of phenomenal character, and since there are many issues involved in 
such a discussion that are quite complicated in their own right, I’d like to begin this 
conversation by clearly outlining some of the assumptions I make in this paper and by 
clarifying some of the terminology I will use throughout the discussion.  In starting the 
conversation in this way, I hope to engage fellow philosophers with minimal confusion.   
First of all, for the purposes of this paper we will assume that when we say 
someone has a conscious mental state, we are saying that the person has a mental state 
that instantiates the property of state consciousness.  Furthermore, we will understand 
this property of state consciousness to be a relational property consisting in the 
intentional relationship between a first-order state and an appropriate higher-order 
thought that represents that first-order state.
1
  Since this is the characterization of state 
consciousness that HOT theorists most commonly present
2
, and since this is the 
characterization that Lurz also seems to work with, it will suffice for our purposes here.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1
 The precise meaning of this claim will become clearer once I introduce the HOT theory in the next 
section. 
2
 Though HOT theorists do work with this characterization of state consciousness most often (for example, 
see Rosenthal (2002a)), they also suggest that this characterization might not be entirely accurate.  (For 
example, see Rosenthal (2000, 2003, and 2011).)  Since speaking in terms of the more accurate 
characterization will unnecessarily complicate our discussion here, however, and since HOT theorists 
themselves often avoid the more accurate characterization for the very same reason, I feel comfortable 
doing so here as well.  I do believe that my arguments in this paper are compatible with the more strict 
account of state consciousness, though I do not intend to provide any argument to that effect here.   
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Second, there is agreement among those in the debate that in saying that a mental 
state is state conscious, we mean to identify that there’s something it’s like for the person 
who instantiates that state.  The phrase ‘something it’s like for…’ was introduced by 
Thomas Nagel (1974) and has since become a common way of loosely and intuitively 
describing the essential subjective and experiential aspect of consciousness, for example, 
the redness one experiences when one consciously sees a red tomato or the painfulness 
one feels when one consciously pinches a finger in a door.  This essential, subjective 
nature of consciousness is also sometimes referred to as the qualitative or phenomenal 
character of consciousness or simply as what-it’s-like-ness.  I will use these terms 
interchangeably throughout our discussion and I ask the reader to note that I intend no 
theoretical ties to any one particular theory of phenomenal character when I use terms 
like ‘phenomenal character’ or any of the others mentioned here.
3
   
Third, we will follow Lurz (2006) in assuming that there will be some sort of 
phenomenal character affiliated with a creature’s having any sort of state conscious 
mental state.  So, there will be phenomenal character affiliated with one’s having 
conscious sensations and perceptions as well as with one’s having conscious 
propositional attitudes, like conscious beliefs or conscious desires.   
The reader should note, however, that it is unclear whether or not Rosenthal 
would agree with this assumption.  On the one hand, he often says that the phenomenal 
character affiliated with state conscious sensations and perceptions is due to one’s 
representing, via HOTs, various special, qualitative properties that are instantiated by 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3
 For example, despite mentioning Block’s (2011) term for this aspect of experience (i.e., ‘what-it’s-like-
ness’), I do not intend to have any ties to the specific theory of phenomenal consciousness that Block 
himself endorses (see Block 1995).  Instead, I just mean to identify what Weisberg (2011) calls the 
“moderate” reading of terms like ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and ‘what-it’s-like-ness’.   
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only sensory and perceptual states.
4
  It might appear, then, that Rosenthal would not 
endorse the claim that those states that are presumed to lack these qualitative properties 
(in particular, propositional attitude states) would have any phenomenal character 
affiliated with them when they are state conscious.   
On the other hand, Rosenthal also says, for example, that, “[a] state’s being 
conscious is a matter of mental appearance – of how one’s mental life appears to one. …a 
state is conscious only if one is subjectively aware of oneself as being in that state” 
(Rosenthal (2011), p. 431).  With this sort of description of phenomenal character, a 
description which makes no appeal to qualitative properties per se but rather only to 
one’s subjective awareness of mental states, there would seem to be no reason to deny 
that one has a subjective appearance affiliated with being in a conscious belief in addition 
to a subjective appearance affiliated with being in a conscious sensory state.  Since 
Rosenthal’s position on the issue is unclear, and since our aim in this paper is to engage 
with Lurz, who does assume there will be some sort of phenomenal character affiliated 
with a creature’s having any sort of state conscious mental state, we therefore will adopt 
the assumption that there will indeed be something it’s like for a creature who instantiates 
any kind of state conscious mental state.  
 So our assumptions are as follows: When we say a mental state is state conscious 
we mean to identify not only that there is a relational property that we attribute to that 
mental state, namely, state consciousness, but also that there is something it’s like, an 
affiliated phenomenal character, for the bearer of that state.  We can summarize these 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4
 See, for example, Rosenthal (2004). 
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points neutrally by saying that attributions of state consciousness must entail attributions 
of what-it’s-like-ness. 
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, I believe there are two separate aspects 
to the HOT theory’s account of consciousness and that these aspects are rarely 
distinguished from one another.  I would like to take a moment to explain the distinction 
between these aspects now.   
We can differentiate these two aspects by means of the following two questions: 
(1) What is it like for a creature who has a state conscious mental state?; and (2) What 
grounds state consciousness?.  Let’s briefly discuss how these two questions differ. 
Someone who poses the first question, ‘What is it like for a creature who has a 
state conscious mental state?’, is asking for a description of phenomenal character.  For 
example, one might ask, what’s it like for you to consciously be in pain right now, and 
you might answer that you have a dull ache, or a throbbing pain, or a searing pain, and so 
on.  By characterizing your pain as dull, throbbing, or searing, you are identifying aspects 
of phenomenal character – aspects of what it’s like for you as you have this conscious 
pain.   
On the other hand, someone who poses the second question, ‘What grounds state 
consciousness?’, is not asking for an account of your phenomenal character.  Rather, the 
person is asking for an account of what makes it the case that your mental state is state 
conscious rather than unconscious.  Again, for example, they might be asking what 
makes your pain count as being a conscious pain rather than an unconscious pain and you 
might answer by explaining what it is that generates, realizes, or subvenes your pain’s 
property of state consciousness.  To my mind, this is an importantly different question 
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than the first and, as we’ll see, I think the HOT theory provides importantly distinct 
answers to each of these questions. 
I note these things here because the distinctions can be subtle and the phrases 
required to describe these different accounts can get complicated.  So, to be clear, when I 
speak of characterizing the phenomenal character affiliated with state consciousness or of 
what it’s like for someone who has a state conscious state, I intend to be discussing facts 
related to the first of these two questions.  On the other hand, when I speak of what 
grounds state consciousness or of what state consciousness consists in, I intend to be 
discussing facts related to the second of these two questions.   
With these assumptions now explicit and our terminology clarified, we are ready 
to explore the HOT theory’s account of state consciousness.   
3. The Higher-Order Thought Theory on the Constitution of State Consciousness 
The HOT theory is most often presented as an account of what constitutes state 
consciousness.  For example Rosenthal sets up a paper introducing the HOT theory by 
writing,  
Assuming that not all mental states are conscious, we want to know how the 
conscious ones differ from those which are not.  And, even if all mental 
states are conscious, we can still ask what their being conscious consists in.  
We can call this the question of state consciousness.  This is my main 
concern in what follows. 
(Rosenthal (2002a), p. 729, emphasis added.) 
 
In order to determine what state consciousness consists in, HOT theorists begin 
with a simple insight from the everyday folk: We find it natural to say that if a person is 
not aware of her mental state in any way, then her mental state is not conscious.  This 
implies, conversely, that a conscious mental state must be a state a person is aware of in 
some suitable way.  HOT theorists take this folk intuition to entail that the difference 
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between a mental state when it’s state conscious and when it’s unconscious lies in its 
possessor’s awareness of it, and so they set out to explain the property of state 
consciousness in terms of a person’s awareness of her own mental states.  HOT theorists 
hypothesize that a person comes to have this sort of awareness by forming higher-order 
thoughts about her mental states and so they argue, specifically, that a mental state is state 
conscious only when that mental state is represented by an appropriate higher-order 
thought (HOT).
5
  Let’s unpack this claim a little further. 
First, note that the higher-order thoughts required for state consciousness are 
called higher-order thoughts simply because they are mental representations of other 
mental representations.  It is common practice, for example, to refer to representations of 
non-mental objects or facts as first-order representations, to refer to representations of 
first-order states as second-order representations, to refer to representations of second-
order states as third-order representations, and so on.  Any mental state that is not a first-
order representation counts as being a higher-order representation. 
Second, we saw above that not just any higher-order thought will suffice for state 
consciousness, the HOT has to be appropriate.  According to Rosenthal, a HOT is 
appropriate when it is noninferential (i.e., it is not the product of any conscious inference 
or observation), when it is nondispositional (i.e., when a person actually instantiates the 
HOT rather than merely having a disposition to form such a HOT), when it is assertoric 
(i.e., when the propositional attitude of the thought is one of assertion), and when the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5
 For example, Rosenthal writes, “On higher-order theories, first-order states do not inherit the property of 
being conscious from higher-order states.  On such theories, the property of a state’s being conscious 
consists of one’s being aware of oneself as being in that state, and the higher-order states constitute those 
awarenesses.  The HOA [i.e. Higher-Order Awareness] does not pass along the property of being conscious 
to the first-order state; it simply serves to make one aware of that state in the right way, and that is what the 
state’s being conscious consists of” (Rosenthal (2012), p. 1428, emphasis added.) 
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HOT represents its bearer as being in a particular mental state (for example, only an 
appropriately formed HOT with the content, roughly, “I believe that there’s an apple on 
the table” will result in the conscious belief that there is an apple on the table).  Though 
all of these conditions are important components of the theory, only one will be 
particularly relevant to our discussion here – the noninferential condition – so let’s look 
at that one in a little more detail.
6
 
One common way of characterizing the phenomenal character affiliated with state 
consciousness is by saying that some content or information comes to be suddenly and 
immediately before one’s mind.  It’s taken to be a fact up for explanation that the 
phenomenology appears sudden and immediate, rather than being mediated in some way, 
and the HOT theory explains this phenomenological fact by positing that the HOTs that 
are involved in making our mental states state conscious must not be arrived at by means 
of conscious inference or observation.  If we came to have our HOTs via a process of 
conscious inference or observation (for example, perhaps we recollect our own recent 
behaviour and surmise that we must be anxious about an impending deadline), then 
insofar as we are conscious of the inferences or observations that mediated the process of 
coming to be aware of our mental states, the resulting awareness we have of our mental 
states would no longer seem to be sudden and immediate.     
This fact about phenomenological immediacy also points to another important 
aspect of the HOT theory, the claim that the HOTs which constitute the requisite 
awareness of one’s mental state will, themselves, not be state conscious mental states.  
This claim helps us account for the phenomenological immediacy of conscious 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
6
 For a concise discussion of the conditions that make a HOT appropriate as well as the arguments leading 
to the account of state consciousness presented here see Rosenthal (2002b), especially Section II, “The 
Hypothesis”, pg. 408-411.   
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experience because, again, it’s a fact up for explanation that it generally never seems to 
us that there is a HOT mediating our awareness of our state conscious mental states.  
Since the HOT theory does say that HOTs mediate this process, they therefore also must 
claim that there is not anything it’s like for someone to be instantiating those HOTs, else 
the person would notice those HOTs as mediators.  Hence HOT theorists argue that the 
HOTs required for state consciousness are not themselves state conscious mental states.   
 This is not to say that HOTs can never be state conscious mental states however.  
In fact, whether or not one’s HOTs are state conscious will be the determining factor 
between whether a state counts as being state conscious in what we’ll call the basic sense, 
or whether that state counts as being state conscious in the introspective sense. 
According to HOT theorists, basic state consciousness occurs when a first-order 
mental state (i.e., a mental state that represents facts about or objects in the world) is 
represented by an appropriate second-order thought (a thought about that first-order 
state).  In this case, the second-order thought itself will be an unconscious state because 
there is no further HOT formed about it.  On the other hand, introspective state 
consciousness occurs when this second-order mental state (i.e., the HOT involved in 
basic state consciousness) is represented by a third-order thought (a thought about the 
second-order thought about the first-order state).  Again, this third-order thought itself 
will not be state conscious in these cases, because it is not represented by a higher-order 
thought.
7
   
So, for example, if George believes that there is an apple on the table, and if his 
belief is to be state conscious in the basic sense, HOT theorists would say George must 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
7
 For a concise description of these accounts of basic and introspective state consciousness and the 
differences between the two see, for example, Rosenthal (2005), p. 48-49. 
!!!'*!
"
!
also form an appropriate second-order thought with the content, roughly, “I believe that 
there is an apple on the table”.  If George’s belief is to be introspectively state conscious, 
however, he would need to form not only the first-order belief and a second-order thought 
about himself as having that belief, but also a third-order thought about the second-order 
thought, so a thought with the content, roughly, “I think that I believe that there is an 
apple on the table”. 
And so we see the HOT theorists’ account of what constitutes state consciousness.  
A mental state, M, is state conscious if and only if M is represented by an appropriate 
higher-order thought.  Basic state consciousness involves the formation of a second-order 
thought that itself is not state conscious, and introspective state consciousness involves 
the formation of a third-order thought that renders the second-order thought state 
conscious.  
As mentioned, the HOT theory also provides an account of the phenomenal 
character affiliated with state consciousness.  As we will need to understand Lurz’s 
interpretation of this account in order to understand his Phenomenal Character Argument 
against the HOT theory, let’s turn to his interpretation now.  (I will present my own 
alternative interpretation at the end of the paper.) 
4. Lurz’s Interpretation: The Higher-Order Thought Theory on the Phenomenal 
Character of State Consciousness 
As noted earlier, when we say that there’s something it’s like for a creature, we 
are saying that there’s some content or information that seems suddenly and immediately 
to present itself before one’s mind.  Hence, in order to characterize what it’s like for a 
creature, we would have to characterize what the creature suddenly and immediately 
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becomes conscious of in such instances.  It is therefore in these terms that we will discuss 
the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character. 
Because the HOT theory postulates that state consciousness consists in the 
awareness we have of our mental states (as a result of forming appropriate HOTs about 
those states), Lurz believes HOT theorists also explain the phenomenal character 
affiliated with state consciousness in terms of this higher-order awareness.  Specifically, 
Lurz takes the HOT theorist to be claiming that what it’s like for someone who has a state 
conscious mental state, M, can be captured by saying that the bearer of M suddenly and 
immediately becomes conscious of what her HOT represents, namely, of the fact that she 
has M.  
Now, there’s no question why Lurz might interpret HOT theorists to be giving 
such an account.  Rosenthal does, after all, appear to give precisely this sort of account as 
he often says things like, “…a mental state’s being conscious consists in our being 
conscious of being in that state” (Rosenthal, 2002a, p. 745).  In light of explicit 
statements like these, Lurz does seem justified in taking HOT theorists to be explaining 
the phenomenal character affiliated with state consciousness in terms of one’s becoming 
conscious of the fact that one has a particular lower-order state. 
Since Lurz’s argument is specifically targeted at the HOT theory’s account of the 
phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness, let’s spell out an example 
of this account in those terms.  We saw that, according to the HOT theory, for George’s 
first-order belief that there’s an apple on the table to be state conscious in the basic sense, 
George must form a second-order thought with the content, roughly, “I believe that 
there’s an apple on the table”.  Lurz interprets the HOT theory also to be saying that 
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when George has this state conscious first-order belief, what it’s like for George is that he 
suddenly and immediately becomes higher-order conscious of the fact that he believes 
that there is an apple on the table, so he becomes conscious of the very fact represented 
by his second-order thought.  By claiming that the consciousness in this case is higher-
order, Lurz simply means that what George becomes conscious of is a fact about his own 
mental states, namely, the fact that he has a particular belief that there is an apple on the 
table.   
We can contrast this claim, for example, with the claim that the phenomenal 
character affiliated with basic state consciousness is instead characterized by saying that 
one becomes first-order conscious of objects in or facts about the world.  According to 
Lurz (2003), Fred Dretske (1995) provides such an account.  The consciousness here is 
first-order because it is a consciousness of facts or objects in the world, rather than a 
consciousness of mental facts or objects.  On this account then, when George’s first-order 
belief is state conscious in the basic sense, what it’s like for George is that he suddenly 
and immediately becomes first-order conscious of the apple on the table or, perhaps, of 
the fact that there is an apple on the table.   
Both of these accounts can be contrasted with the claim that the phenomenal 
character affiliated with basic state consciousness is characterized by one’s becoming 
same-order conscious of what one’s mental states represent.  Lurz (2003, 2006) himself 
promotes such a view.  Lurz refers to this sort of consciousness as being same-order 
because one is said to become suddenly and immediately conscious of precisely the same 
representational content that is expressed by one’s state conscious mental state itself, as 
opposed to becoming first-order conscious of the facts represented by that state conscious 
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state and as opposed to becoming higher-order conscious of that fact that one has that 
state conscious state.
8
  On this account then, when George’s first-order belief is state 
conscious in the basic sense, what it’s like for George is that he becomes same-order 
conscious of the propositional content expressed by his belief, namely, the proposition 
that there is an apple on the table. 
So, according to Lurz each of these accounts makes a different claim about the 
phenomenal character one must experience when one has a state conscious state in the 
basic sense.  These differences in phenomenal character are captured by the differences in 
what one is said to become conscious of when one has a state conscious mental state.  
Importantly, as Lurz understands the HOT theory, it claims that one must become 
conscious of the fact that one has a particular first-order state – the very fact represented 
by one’s second-order thought – when one comes to have a mental state that is state 
conscious in the basic sense.
9
  With this in mind, we are ready to see where Lurz thinks 
the HOT theory goes wrong with this account of phenomenal character. 
5. Lurz’s Phenomenal Character Argument Against the Higher-Order Thought 
Theory of Consciousness 
The essence of Lurz’s Phenomenal Character Argument is as follows:  Lurz 
argues that the HOT theorists’ account of the phenomenal character affiliated with basic 
state consciousness is incorrect because someone can have a mental state that is state 
conscious in the basic sense without being higher-order conscious of the fact that she has 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
8
 Specifically, Lurz argues that we become conscious of the representational content of our mental states by 
forming an appropriate deictic demonstrative belief that identifies the representational content of those 
mental states.  For example, in order for George’s belief to be state conscious, George must form a separate 
belief with the content “It’s that there is an apple on the table”, where the ‘it’s’ here demonstratively refers 
to the proposition expressed by George’s first-order belief and the rest identifies the actual proposition 
expressed by George’s first-order belief about the apple.  For more on the details of Lurz’s account see 
Lurz (2003, 2006). 
+
"For further discussion of his interpretation of the HOT theory see, for example, Lurz (2006), p. 325-328."
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that mental state.  This means that HOT theorists were wrong in saying that the 
phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness must involve one’s 
becoming higher-order conscious of what one’s HOT represents, and hence this 
demonstrates that the HOT theory is mistaken.  Since this aspect of the account fails, 
Lurz concludes that the HOT theory should be rejected.   
Lurz’s argument proceeds in roughly two stages:  First he shows that higher-order 
consciousness of our own mental states is not a necessary component of the phenomenal 
character affiliated with state consciousness.  Then he concludes, given his interpretation 
of the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character, that the HOT theory must be 
mistaken and can therefore be rejected.   
To support the first half of this argument, Lurz (2006) presents an intuitive 
example of someone’s being in a mental state that is state conscious in the basic sense 
while she also fails to be higher-order consciousness of the fact that she has that very 
state.  This example helps Lurz establish his conclusion that a higher-order consciousness 
of what one’s HOT represents cannot be a necessary component of the phenomenal 
character affiliated with basic state consciousness.  
Lurz’s (2006) example is as follows:  Imagine a colleague informs you that 
someone has stolen your backpack out of your office.  Perhaps you’re not initially all that 
upset because the backpack wasn’t that valuable, you had removed the books from it, and 
so on.  After a moment, however, it dawns on you – your keys are in that bag!  You then 
rush to call the campus police to try to get your backpack returned.   
Lurz thinks there are two important facts established by this example.  First, at the 
moment, call it t, that it dawns on you that your keys are in your bag, it’s clear that there 
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comes to be something it’s like for you to believe that your keys are in your bag, hence 
we should agree that your belief that your keys are in your bag becomes state conscious 
at t.  You might have formed that belief earlier in the morning, say, when you put your 
keys in the bag, but that belief was not state conscious at the moment immediately prior 
to time t; instead, it came to be state conscious (or maybe, came to be state conscious 
again) only at time t.   
The question is then how to properly characterize the phenomenal character 
affiliated with this state conscious belief.  Lurz’s answer is as follows: 
 
…what seems to be going on is that at time t I suddenly come to be actually 
immediately aware of something, and this something seems to be what I 
believe…not, that I believe…something. …I seem to become at time t 
actually immediately aware of what I believe with respect to the 
whereabouts of my keys, for at time t, what I believe with respect to the 
whereabouts of my keys – namely, that my keys are in my bag – suddenly 
occurs to me in a way which, from my point of view, did not involve any 
inference or observation on my part.  Now, if what one believes when one 
believes that p…is the proposition that p…, then what…I seem to become 
actually immediately aware of is a proposition. …it is the proposition that 
my keys are in my bag… 
(Lurz (2006), p. 332, original emphasis.)
10
 
 
 
Here we see the second fact established by this example.  Lurz argues that what 
he is conscious of at time t is actually what he believes about the location of his keys, i.e., 
the proposition ‘that my keys are in my bag’.
11
  Importantly, it does seem that this 
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10
 At the end of the paper I introduce a distinction between consciousness and awareness.  The astute reader 
might notice that in the passage quoted here Lurz uses the term ‘aware’ rather than the term ‘conscious’.  
Though he does not say this explicitly, and hence I am noting the issue for the reader, Lurz (2006) appears 
to use these two terms interchangeably and so he does not appear to be sensitive to the sort of distinction I 
will introduce later on. 
11
 Lurz does provide an argument for his claim that we become conscious of the proposition expressed by 
our conscious beliefs, rather than becoming conscious of the worldly facts represented by our beliefs.  
Since this argument is not central to our discussion however, I will refrain from presenting it here.  I refer 
the interested reader to Lurz (2003, 2006) for further details of that argument. 
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characterization captures the phenomenal character that would be affiliated with such 
belief becoming state conscious in this scenario.  This seems clear when you imagine 
yourself in the example.  There’s a sudden and overwhelming sinking sensation – my 
keys are in that bag! – and as you imagine experiencing that realization, and imagine the 
experience of it sinking in, notice that it seems true that you would not also have an 
explicit higher-order consciousness of the fact that you are believing that your keys are in 
the bag.  Hence Lurz’s example does seem to characterize the phenomenal character 
affiliated with this conscious belief, and it does seem to do so without making any 
mention of one’s becoming conscious of the fact that one believes that one’s keys are in 
one’s bag.  
Furthermore, since we have already established that the belief in this scenario 
counts as a state conscious belief at moment t, we also can see now that this example 
demonstrates precisely what the HOT theory, as interpreted by Lurz, should predict not to 
be possible – one comes to be same-order conscious of what one’s state conscious belief 
represents (i.e., the proposition ‘that my keys are in my bag’) without also becoming 
higher-order conscious of the fact that one believes that one’s keys are in one’s bag.  
Since, at t, one would both have a state conscious belief (in the basic sense) and yet fail to 
be higher-order consciousness of the fact that one has that belief, so it would appear that 
being higher-order conscious of what one’s HOT represents cannot be a necessary 
component of the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness after all.   
The last step in the argument then follows simply:  Since Lurz takes the HOT 
theory to be saying that this sort of higher-order consciousness is a necessary component 
of the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness, and since this 
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example shows that it is not, Lurz concludes that the HOT theory must provide an 
incorrect account of phenomenal character.  We can summarize Lurz’s Phenomenal 
Character Argument against the HOT theory as follows:   
(1) If we can characterize the phenomenal character affiliated with a 
person’s having a state conscious mental state, in the basic sense, 
without saying that she becomes higher-order conscious of the fact that 
she has that mental state, then becoming higher-order conscious of the 
fact that one has a particular mental state cannot be a necessary 
component of the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state 
consciousness.  
 
(2) We can characterize the phenomenal character affiliated with a person’s 
having a state conscious mental state, in the basic sense, without saying 
that she becomes higher-order conscious of the fact that she has that 
mental state. 
 
This point is demonstrated by the stolen backpack example.  Following from (1) and (2) 
we get: 
(3) Therefore, becoming higher-order conscious of the fact that one has a 
particular mental state cannot be a necessary component of the 
phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness. 
 
(4) The HOT theory says that one must form an appropriate HOT about 
oneself as being in a first-order state for that first-order state to be state 
conscious in the basic sense. 
 
This is the HOT theorists’ explanation of what constitutes state consciousness. 
(5) If the HOT theory says that one must form an appropriate HOT about 
oneself as being in a first-order state for that first-order state to be state 
conscious in the basic sense, then the HOT theory also must be claiming 
that higher-order consciousness of the fact that one has a particular 
mental state is a necessary component of the phenomenal character 
affiliated with basic state consciousness. 
 
I take it that this is a charitable way of connecting the claims actually made by 
HOT theorists with Lurz’s particular interpretation of the theory’s account of 
phenomenal character.  Following from (4) and (5) we get: 
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(6) Therefore, the HOT theory must be claiming that higher-order 
consciousness of the fact that one has a particular mental state is a 
necessary component of the phenomenal character affiliated with basic 
state consciousness. 
 
(7) If the HOT theory claims that higher-order consciousness of the fact that 
one has a particular mental state is a necessary component of the 
phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness and yet 
this claim is incorrect, then the HOT theory must be mistaken and can be 
rejected. 
 
(8) Therefore, the HOT theory must be mistaken and can be rejected. 
 
This final conclusion follows from (3), (6), and (7).  With the logic of Lurz’s argument 
now clear, we are ready to see why the argument fails.  Let’s move to that analysis now. 
6. An Analysis of Lurz’s Phenomenal Character Argument 
In the first half of his argument, Lurz demonstrates that a person’s being higher-
order conscious of the fact that she has a particular lower-order state is not a necessary 
component of the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness.  
Instead, it would appear that a characterization in terms of one’s same-order 
consciousness of what one’s mental state represents is a sufficient characterization of the 
phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness.  I am willing to grant 
Lurz these conclusions. 
In the second half of his argument, Lurz argues that we are forced to reject the 
HOT theory because it endorses an incorrect account of the phenomenal character 
affiliated with basic state consciousness.  This is where I disagree.  Lurz’s argument for 
this further conclusion rests on an assumption (represented as premise 5 in my 
reconstruction of his argument above) that, in saying one must form a HOT for one to 
have a mental state that is state conscious in the basic sense, HOT theorists also must be 
claiming that we cannot characterize what it’s like for someone who has a state conscious 
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state in the basics sense, without saying that she becomes higher-order conscious of the 
fact that she has a particular first-order state.  I think we can, and should, reject this 
assumption.  In fact, I will argue that HOT theorists cannot claim that the phenomenal 
character affiliated with basic state consciousness involves one’s becoming higher-order 
conscious of the fact that one has a particular lower-order state.  Hence Lurz’s 
interpretation of the HOT theory must be incorrect and his argument against the HOT 
theory must be rejected.  Let’s turn to my argument now. 
6.1 The Higher-Order Thought Theory Cannot Characterize Phenomenal Character 
in terms of Higher-Order Consciousness 
My argument is actually rather simple:  Because the HOTs required for basic state 
consciousness are themselves unconscious states, we cannot characterize the phenomenal 
character of basic state consciousness in terms of one’s coming to be conscious of what 
these HOTs represent.  Let’s lay out the facts that lead to this conclusion. 
First, we agreed earlier that in attributing state consciousness to a particular 
mental state, we also must be identifying that there is some kind of phenomenal character 
affiliated with the instantiation of that state.  Conversely, in identifying a mental state as 
unconscious, we must be identifying that there is not any phenomenal character affiliated 
with being in that mental state.   
Second, HOT theorists are very clear that the second-order thoughts required for 
basic state consciousness are, themselves, unconscious mental states.  We saw this, for 
example, in the way HOT theorists account for the seeming immediacy of the awareness 
we have of our mental states and in the fact that, according to the HOT theory, when a 
HOT itself is state conscious, what results is actually introspective state consciousness, 
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rather than basic state consciousness.  Clearly, then, since the second-order thoughts 
required for basic state consciousness are themselves unconscious states, it therefore also 
must be the case that there cannot be any phenomenal character affiliated with the 
instantiation of these HOTs.  With these facts in mind, let’s take a fresh look at Lurz’s 
interpretation of the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character. 
Lurz takes the HOT theory to be claiming that the phenomenal character affiliated 
with basic state consciousness necessarily involves one’s becoming higher-order 
conscious of the fact that one is instantiating the first-order state conscious state.  Notice, 
however, that the fact that one is said to become conscious of here (the fact that one is in 
a particular first-order state) is precisely the fact that an appropriate HOT is presumed to 
represent.  Recall, for example, that in order for George’s belief that there is an apple on 
the table to be state conscious in the basic sense, George must form an appropriate HOT 
with the content, roughly, “I believe that there is an apple on the table”.  So George’s 
HOT represents the fact that he instantiates this particular belief, and this is precisely the 
fact Lurz interprets the HOT theory to be claiming that George must become conscious of 
when his belief is state conscious in the basic sense.  This means that, on Lurz’s 
interpretation, the HOT theory claims that one becomes conscious of exactly what one’s 
HOT represents, whenever one has a state conscious state, in the basic sense.   
Notice, however, that in saying that it’s the content of one’s HOT that suddenly 
and immediately comes before one’s mind, it would seem that one is saying that there is 
phenomenal character affiliated with instantiating these HOTs after all.  I see no way of 
getting around this conclusion.  In saying that there is phenomenal character affiliated 
with the HOTs required for basic state consciousness, however, one would thereby 
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contradict the HOT theory’s very clear commitment to the fact that the HOTs involved in 
basic state consciousness are themselves unconscious states.  Since unconscious states 
can have no affiliated phenomenal character, it cannot be the case both that these states 
are unconscious and that these states have affiliated phenomenal character; one of these 
claims must be rejected.   
As it turns out, it appears that the HOT theory cannot reject the claim that the 
HOTs involved in basic state consciousness are unconscious states, however.  If HOT 
theorists were to reject this claim, and hence were to say that these HOTs are themselves 
state conscious, then the theory would require that these HOTs be represented by yet 
higher-order states, and then those further higher-order states would also have to be 
conscious and so would also have to be represented by yet higher-order states, and so on.  
This reasoning would lead the theory into infinite regress.  It would appear that the only 
option then is to reject the alternative claim, namely, that the HOTs involved in basic 
state consciousness have affiliated phenomenal character. 
For these reasons, I take it the HOT theory cannot be claiming that the 
phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness necessarily involves one’s 
becoming higher-order conscious of the fact that one has a particular first-order mental 
state.  If HOT theorists were to claim that basic state consciousness involves coming to 
be conscious of what one’s HOTs represent, then they would be claiming that there is 
something it’s like for one to be instantiating these HOTs, hence they would be 
contradicting their own claim that these HOTs are not state conscious.  Since it appears 
that they cannot reject the claim that these HOTs are unconscious, we must instead reject 
the claim that there is a phenomenal character affiliated with instantiating these HOTs.  
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So we can conclude that the HOT theory cannot be claiming that one becomes conscious 
of the content represented by one’s unconscious HOTs when one has mental states that 
are state conscious in the basic sense.  It turns out, therefore, that Lurz must have 
mischaracterized the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character. 
If the argument so far is sound, we can also conclude that Lurz’s argument against 
the HOT theory must be rejected.  Insofar as Lurz’s argument is based on the assumption 
that HOT theorists account for the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state 
consciousness in terms of higher-order consciousness of what one’s HOTs represent, and 
insofar as we now see that this cannot be the case (because the requisite HOTs are 
unconscious states), we can reject the assumption represented as premise 5 in my 
reconstruction of Lurz’s argument, and thus we can reject Lurz’s conclusion that the 
HOT theory’s account of phenomenal character is mistaken. 
6.2 Two Accounts Contained Within the Higher-Order Thought Theory 
The discussion above brings to light an interesting fact about the HOT theory that 
often appears to go unnoticed.  In light of the conclusions drawn above we can see that 
the HOT theory can and must provide distinct answers to the two questions identified 
earlier – the question of what constitutes state consciousness and the question of what it’s 
like to have state conscious states.  Specifically, with regard to the question of what 
grounds or constitutes state consciousness, HOT theorists clearly provide an answer in 
terms of higher-order representation, as they say that state consciousness consists in one’s 
higher-order representing oneself as being in a certain lower-order mental state.  As 
regards the question of phenomenal character, however, HOT theorists cannot be 
providing an answer in terms of higher-order representation, because they cannot be 
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saying that the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness involves 
one’s becoming conscious of what one’s unconscious HOT represents.  Since only one of 
these questions is answered in terms of higher-order representation, we see that the 
questions of constitution and of phenomenal character must be separated if we are to fully 
comprehend the HOT account of state consciousness.  We can also see now that it is 
Lurz’s failure to notice the separation of these two accounts within the HOT theory that 
constitutes the mistake in his argument.  
7. An Alternative Interpretation: The Higher-Order Thought Theory on the 
Phenomenal Character of State Consciousness 
Though I will not provide a detailed discussion of this point here, I would like to 
note that I think it is actually possible for the HOT theorists to endorse an account of the 
phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness that is similar to the same-
order account that Lurz (2003, 2006) endorses.  In fact, I even think there is textual 
evidence to support an interpretation of the theory as providing such an account.  I will 
briefly outline how I think this new account might proceed, then I will present the textual 
evidence that I think supports this interpretation.  
I think HOT theorists could argue that what it’s like for someone who has a state 
conscious state in the basic sense is that she comes to be conscious of what her state 
conscious state represents.  In order to see how HOT theorists might be endorsing such a 
view, however, we must introduce a distinction between full-blown consciousness and 
mere awareness.  In particular, if we reserve the term ‘consciousness’ for all and only 
those phenomena affiliated with some sort of what-it’s-like-ness, and introduce the term 
‘awareness’ to identify any sort of mental registration of information that has no affiliated 
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what-it’s-like-ness (for example, the kind of mental registration that occurs in subliminal 
perception or blindsight) then I believe the HOT theory can comfortably endorse the 
following two principles: 
The Awareness Principle: Let M be any mental state that at times can be 
state conscious and at other times can be unconscious.  When a subject 
instantiates M without also forming an appropriate HOT about being in M, 
M will enable the subject to be aware of what M represents, in the sense that 
she can be differentially responsive to what M represents, but since M will 
not be state conscious, there will not be anything it’s like for the subject to 
be instantiating M at that time. 
 
The Phenomenal Character Principle: When a mental state, M, is 
represented by an appropriate HOT, and hence when M is state conscious, 
the creature instantiating these states will become same-order conscious of 
what M represents. 
 
Combined with the HOT theory’s account of what constitutes state consciousness, 
these principles would entail the following characterization of the phenomenal character 
affiliated with state consciousness:  A person who has a state conscious mental state in 
the basic sense, will become conscious of what her first-order mental state represents and, 
since she forms a second-order thought of the right sort but that second-order thought is 
unconscious, she will become aware of what her second-order thought represents.  So, 
for example, if George instantiates the belief that there is an apple on the table, and 
George also forms an appropriate HOT that he has such a belief, he will come to be 
conscious of the fact that there is an apple on the table (or, as Lurz argues, of the 
proposition ‘that there is an apple on the table’) and he will come to be aware of himself 
as having that belief. 
With these two principles, we can also draw out a full characterization of the 
phenomenal character affiliated with introspective state consciousness.  Since 
introspective state consciousness involves forming a third-order thought that, in turn, 
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makes it the case that one’s second-order thought is state conscious, we can see that a 
person with an introspectively state conscious mental state will become conscious of 
what her second-order thought represents and she will become aware of what her third-
order thought represents.  So, in terms of our example, George will become conscious of 
himself as believing that there is an apple on the table (and thereby also become 
conscious of the fact that there is an apple on the table or of the proposition ‘that there is 
an apple on the table’) and he will become aware of himself as thinking that he believes 
that there is an apple on the table (since this is what he represents with his unconscious 
third-order thought).
12
  
And thus we see a new way of interpreting the HOT theory’s account of the 
phenomenal character affiliated with basic and introspective state consciousness.  
Though, admittedly, HOT theorists are rarely careful to draw the distinction between 
awareness and consciousness that I’ve introduced here, they do sometimes draw this 
distinction and, when they do, their account does seem to be in line with the account I 
have just outlined.  For example, consider Rosenthal’s comments in the following 
passage (and please forgive the length of the quote, I was compelled to include it all 
because it captures a lot of the points I have argued for here): 
There is a natural way of understanding how conscious states differ 
from mental states that are not conscious.  No mental state is conscious if 
the individual that is in that state is in no way aware of it.  If somebody 
thinks, desires or feels something but is wholly unaware of doing so, then 
that thought, desire or feeling is not a conscious state.   
Experimental work on non-conscious perception typically exploits 
this commonsense observation.  Participants sometimes deny seeing a 
stimulus even when there is evidence, say from priming, that the relevant 
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 Notice, on this account, one does becomes higher-order consciousness of what one’s HOTs represent but 
only when one has states that are introspectively state conscious.  This is in contrast to Lurz’s interpretation 
of the HOT theory, where this sort of phenomenal character was presumed to be a necessary component of 
the phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness.  
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visual information has affected psychological processing.  The effect on 
subsequent psychological processing, moreover, typically reflects the 
perceptual discriminations that are characteristic of conscious visual states, 
e.g. among colours and shapes.  We commonly conclude that the visual state 
occurred but without being conscious.  In such cases, a participant’s denial 
of seeing the stimulus reflects not a failure to see, but simply a lack of 
awareness of seeing.  Things are the same outside experimental work.  If a 
person denies wanting something but acts as people typically do when they 
want that thing, then we see the person as having that desire, though a desire 
that is not conscious.  Novelists and dramatists have described such 
situations for centuries.  
Higher-order theories take this commonsense observation as basic to 
understanding how conscious states differ from mental states that are not 
conscious.  Because no mental state of which one is wholly unaware is 
conscious, conscious states are mental states we are in some suitable way 
aware of.  Higher-order theories differ among themselves about just what 
kind of awareness is required for a mental state to be conscious, but they are 
agreed that a state’s being conscious involves some form of HOA [i.e., 
Higher-Order Awareness].   
When somebody perceives something subliminally, so that the 
perception is not conscious, there is nonetheless a kind of awareness of the 
perceived stimulus.  It may sound awkward to speak of a non-conscious 
state that nonetheless makes one aware of something, but we can distinguish 
the conscious and non-conscious cases in a completely natural way.  When 
one subliminally perceives something, one is aware of that thing but not 
consciously aware of it; when one consciously perceives the stimulus, one is 
consciously aware of it.  
(Rosenthal (2012), p. 1425.) 
 
Here we see Rosenthal’s commitment to the same sort of distinction between 
consciousness and awareness that I introduced above.  We also see him saying, in this 
admittedly rare instance where he draws such a distinction, that state consciousness 
consists in one’s awareness of one’s mental states, not in one’s consciousness of those 
states.  Finally, and most importantly, we see Rosenthal saying that what one is conscious 
of when one has a state conscious mental state is actually what the lower-order state 
represents, he does not say, and so Lurz was mistaken to interpret the HOT theorists as 
saying, that one becomes conscious of what one’s HOT itself represents. I take this to be 
demonstrated in the last sentence quoted here, where Rosenthal says that subliminal 
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perception leads to a mere awareness of the stimuli, whereas conscious perception leads 
to a full-blown consciousness of the stimuli.  Notice, Rosenthal does not say that 
conscious perception leads to a full-blown consciousness of the fact that one has a 
particular perception.  In light of these comments it would appear that the interpretation 
of the theory I’ve just presented seems to fit well with Rosenthal’s own more careful 
presentation of the HOT theory.  
As I mentioned earlier, there is currently very limited discussion of the HOT 
theory’s account of phenomenal character.  Furthermore, because HOT theorists rarely do 
phrase things in a way that respects the distinction between consciousness and awareness 
that I’ve introduced above, they actually do sometimes speak in ways that seem more in 
line with Lurz’s interpretation of the theory.  It is for these reasons that I call other 
philosophers to join me in this discussion of the HOT theory’s account of phenomenal 
character.  I maintain that HOT theorists have always been very clear in noting that the 
HOTs required for basic state consciousness are, themselves, not state conscious states.  
So I maintain that it is this aspect of their theory, in conjunction with the assumption that 
there cannot be anything it’s like to be in a mental state that is not state conscious, that 
forces us to reinterpret the explicit claims often made by HOT theorists and to conclude 
that in fact the theory cannot provide the account of phenomenal character that Lurz 
attributes to it.  Though I think my arguments here are sound, I believe this is an 
interesting and underexplored area of the HOT theory that deserves more attention.   
8. Conclusion   
To recap, I have defended the HOT Theory of Consciousness against Lurz’s 
Phenomenal Character Argument by arguing that the HOT theory cannot claim that the 
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phenomenal character affiliated with basic state consciousness involves one’s becoming 
conscious of what one’s unconscious HOTs represent.  Since this conclusion entails that 
Lurz’s argument rests on a mischaracterization of the HOT theory’s account of 
phenomenal character, I can reject Lurz’s argument.  
This discussion also brought to light an important and often unnoticed aspect of 
the HOT theory, namely, that HOT theory provides distinct accounts of what grounds 
state consciousness and of what it’s like to have state conscious states.  Importantly, we 
learned that only the former account can be given in terms of higher-order representation.  
This is a lesson that we must take seriously if we are to fully comprehend and properly 
assess the HOT theory’s account of state consciousness. 
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Paper 3: An Alternative Way to Defend the Higher-Order Thought Theory 
of Consciousness Against the Misrepresentation Objection 
  
1. Introduction 
In this paper I present a new way of defending the Higher-Order Thought Theory 
of Consciousness against the Misrepresentation Objection.
1
  
As it is usually understood, the HOT theory claims that a mental state is conscious 
if and only if it is represented by an appropriate higher-order thought (HOT) to the effect 
that one is in that very state.  The theory allows, however, that a HOT might misrepresent 
a person as being in a state that she is not in fact in and that, despite this 
misrepresentation, it would still seem to the person that she is in the state she, in fact, is 
not instantiating.  Such cases of misrepresentation are known in the literature as Empty 
HOT cases and they are the source of a particularly persistent objection to the HOT 
theory – the Misrepresentation Objection.   
According to Ned Block (2011a, 2011b), who is the most recent proponent of this 
objection
2
, the problem is that the HOT theory explains conscious states by providing a 
set of conditions that are supposed to be necessary and sufficient for a person’s having 
conscious states.  Block argues that these conditions are shown to be inadequate, 
however, because the conditions lead to incompatible predictions about the presence of 
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 Though my claim is novel relative to anything David Rosenthal has ever said in response to the 
Misrepresentation Objection, it has recently come to my attention that Richard Brown (2012) may suggest a 
solution to this objection that is somewhat similar to my own.  Specifically, like myself, Brown suggests 
that there may be two separate sorts of consciousness explained by the HOT theory.  In contrast to my 
claim, however, it seems that both sorts of consciousness Brown discusses may be forms of state 
consciousness, insofar as they both are taken to be properties of mental states.  I will not get into a detailed 
comparison of our accounts here, though I refer the interested reader to Brown (2012). 
2
 Others have raised versions of the Misrepresentation Objection as well.  For example, see Byrne (1997), 
Neander (1998), and Levine (2001). 
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conscious states in empty HOT cases.  In light of this result, Block concludes that we 
cannot accept the explanation of conscious states that the HOT theory provides and, since 
the HOT theory’s explanation fails, so the HOT theory must be rejected.  
David Rosenthal is the main proponent of the HOT theory and he does provide his 
own reply to this Misrepresentation Objection.
3
  His strategy is to argue that the objectors 
have misunderstood what it means to say that a mental state is conscious and hence that 
the objection, which is based on this false understanding of the theory, can be rejected.  
For example, Rosenthal often speaks as though a mental state’s consciousness is a 
relational property, a property that consists in the relationship of a mental state’s being 
represented by an appropriate HOT.  Despite often accounting for a mental state’s 
consciousness in this way, however, when responding to the Misrepresentation Objection 
Rosenthal consistently makes comments such as the following:   
Since there can be something it’s like for one to be in a state with 
particular mental qualities even if no such state occurs, a mental state’s 
being conscious is not strictly speaking a relational property of that state. 
A state’s being conscious consists in its being a state one is conscious of 
oneself as being in.  Still, it’s convenient to speak loosely of the property 
of a state’s being conscious as relational so as to stress that it is in any case 
not an intrinsic property of mental states. 
(Rosenthal (2005), p. 211.)  
 
Here, Rosenthal suggests that a mental state’s consciousness is not actually a 
relational property after all, instead conscious mental states are simply the mental states 
we are aware of ourselves as being in.  Since one can be aware of oneself as being in a 
particular mental state even if one is in no such state, the issue of whether or not a lower-
order state is actually instantiated becomes irrelevant to the theory’s explanation of this 
sort of awareness, and hence irrelevant to the theory’s account of mental state 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3
 See, for example, Rosenthal (2004, 2011). 
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consciousness.  This entails that empty HOT cases, cases where no relevant lower-order 
state is instantiated, pose no threat to the HOT theory after all. 
Though I do believe that Rosenthal’s reply succeeds in addressing the 
Misrepresentation Objection, I also believe that the objectors find it unconvincing.  This 
is evidenced, for example, by the fact that objectors continue to reissue their attack, 
despite Rosenthal’s consistent responses each time the attack is issued.  It seems that 
objectors have trouble accepting Rosenthal’s reply precisely because his strategy involves 
clarifying the meaning of key terms and concepts within the theory.  Though Rosenthal 
does introduce these clarifications in some of his earliest writings about the HOT theory
4
, 
most discussions of the theory are still couched in terms of the loose, relational notion of 
mental state consciousness.  This means that the details of the more strict account, and the 
implications that account has for other aspects of the theory, are rarely if ever fully 
explored.  Rosenthal’s strategy of responding by appealing to this clarified account 
therefore leaves the objectors feeling slighted; they feel suspicious of whether the 
clarifications Rosenthal suggests are really as minor as he would have us believe.  In light 
of these facts, it is hardly surprising that objectors need further convincing before they are 
willing to accept that the objection has been defeated. 
In this paper I take on the task of convincing the objectors by presenting an 
independent reply to the Misrepresentation Objection.  What’s unique about my strategy 
is that I try to maintain the terms of the debate that the objectors are familiar with, in 
hopes of presenting a reply that the objectors will find more convincing.  Though I do 
think my solution arrives at a final characterization of the HOT theory that is similar to 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4
 See, for example, Rosenthal (1986). 
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the one Rosenthal suggests with his own solution, I will not engage in any argument to 
that effect here.  (Nor will I discuss Rosenthal’s reply any further in this paper.)  Instead, 
my goal is just to provide a response to the Misrepresentation Objection that more clearly 
identifies where the objection departs from the HOT theory and hence that allows the 
objectors to understand how the reply to the objection is satisfying. 
To provide a quick preview, first I argue that Block’s Misrepresentation Objection 
can be seen as being based on an equivocation on two senses of the phrase ‘conscious 
state’.  Then I argue that the HOT theory can be seen as providing separate explanations 
for each sense of ‘conscious state’ and that neither of these explanations turn out to have 
internally incompatible necessary and sufficient conditions in the empty HOT cases.  
Since neither explanation turns out to have internally incompatible conditions, I conclude 
that Block’s Misrepresentation Objection can be rejected.   
The paper proceeds as follows:  I begin by briefly introducing the most common 
interpretation of Rosenthal’s HOT theory and outlining Block’s (2011a, 2011b) version 
of the Misrepresentation Objection.  Because my goal is to present a reply in terms that 
the objectors agree upon, it would be unhelpful for me to describe the HOT theory in the 
more careful terms Rosenthal uses in his reply to the Misrepresentation Objection.  
Despite that fact, note that when I say that a particular claim is made by Rosenthal 
himself, that claim is one that I believe Rosenthal would endorse, even in his most careful 
or strict presentations of his theory.  On the other hand, when I say that a claim is made 
by HOT theorists, that claim is likely only part of the loose characterization of the theory, 
i.e., the characterization of the theory that is most often presented.  
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After setting out this common understanding of the debate, I then introduce two 
senses of the phrase ‘conscious state’, I demonstrate how Block’s representation of the 
HOT theory’s necessary and sufficient conditions can be seen as confusing these two 
senses, and I draw three lessons:  First, I argue that the HOT theory can be seen as 
offering a separate explanation of each sort of consciousness identified by the different 
senses of ‘conscious state’.  Second, I argue that neither of these explanations has 
internally incompatible necessary and sufficient conditions in empty HOT cases, hence I 
conclude that we can reject Block’s objection.  Finally, I briefly discuss one implication 
of my new interpretation of the HOT theory – the fact that it entails that there can be 
something it’s like for a person with empty HOTs, despite the fact that no mental state is 
state conscious.  
 With our plan now in place, let’s begin by outlining the HOT theory and the 
Misrepresentation Objection. 
2. The Common Understanding of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of 
Consciousness 
I will here introduce the HOT theory as it is most often presented and, 
importantly, as the objectors understand it.  This will enable us to draw out the 
Misrepresentation Objection and, eventually, to resolve the objection in a way that 
objectors should find acceptable.   
The HOT theory is most commonly presented as a theory of state consciousness.  
State consciousness is the property that a mental state is said to have when it’s conscious 
and to lack when it’s unconscious.  For example, George may consciously desire a drink 
of water and hence may set out to quench his thirst.  On his way to the faucet, however, 
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perhaps the phone rings and George gets caught up in a conversation with his wife.  
Though George still has the desire for a drink of water at this point, perhaps that desire 
now ceases to be conscious.  In this example, George’s desire would change from being 
state conscious at one moment to being unconscious at the next.   
In saying that a mental state is state conscious, HOT theorists are taken to be 
saying that there’s something it’s like for the person instantiating that state to be having 
that state at that time.  For example, in saying George’s desire is state conscious, HOT 
theorists would be saying that there’s something it’s like for George to be consciously 
desiring a drink of water, and that there ceases to be anything it’s like for George to 
desire the water when that desire ceases to be state conscious.  HOT theorists are 
therefore taken to be providing not just an account of state consciousness but also an 
account of there coming to be something it’s like for a person with a state conscious 
mental state. 
The account of state consciousness provided by HOT theorists is initially 
grounded on an insight borrowed from the everyday folk:  We find it natural to say that if 
a person is not aware of her mental state in any way, then her mental state is not 
conscious.  This implies, conversely, that a conscious mental state must be a state a 
person is aware of being in.  HOT theorists take this folk intuition to entail that the 
difference in a mental state when it’s conscious and when it’s unconscious lies in its 
possessor’s awareness of it.  And so HOT theorists set out to explain state consciousness 
by explaining how a person comes to be aware of her mental states.  As you might have 
guessed, HOT theorists explain how we come to be aware of our mental states in terms of 
our forming higher-order thoughts about those mental states.  Specifically, the HOT 
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theory is commonly understood to be arguing that a mental state is state conscious if and 
only if that mental state is represented by an appropriate
5
 higher-order thought.   
Note that, insofar as state consciousness is understood to consist in a person’s 
awareness of her mental states, and insofar as this awareness is realized by a HOT 
representing that lower-order state, state consciousness is understood to be a relational 
property of mental states; a property grounded in the representational relationship 
between a HOT and the lower-order mental state it represents.  Since this is the 
characterization of state consciousness most familiar to objectors, this is the 
characterization of state consciousness that we will work with throughout the paper.  
So far then, there are five important facts about the theory that we must be sure to 
keep in mind throughout the paper:  First, that the HOT theory is taken to be providing an 
explanation of state consciousness.  Second, that state consciousness is taken to be a 
property attributed to mental states when there’s something it’s like for the bearer of 
those states to be instantiating those states.  Third, that we are understanding state 
consciousness to be a relational property of mental states.  Fourth, that the HOT theory’s 
explanation of state consciousness is provided in terms of a person’s coming to be aware 
of her mental states.  And finally, that a person is said to become aware of her mental 
states by forming an appropriate higher-order thought about herself as being in those 
states.   
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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 The use of the word ‘appropriate’ here can be important since there are some conditions a HOT must meet 
if it is to be appropriate.  For example, the HOT must have an assertoric mental attitude and it must not be 
the product of any conscious inferences or observations.  As these conditions will not play a role in my 
argument, however, I will not discuss them further here.  For a concise discussion of the conditions that 
make a HOT appropriate as well as the arguments leading to the HOT theory of state consciousness 
presented here see Rosenthal (2002), especially Section II, “The Hypothesis”, pg. 408-411.   
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To bring all of this together then, the HOT theory is saying, for example, that in 
order for George’s desire for a drink of water to be state conscious, George would need to 
form an appropriate HOT with the content, roughly, “I desire a drink of water”.  His 
desire and this HOT would thus stand in the appropriate relation, there would come to be 
something it’s like for George to have that desire, and George’s desire would thereby 
count as being state conscious.  With this understanding of the basic aspects of the theory 
now in place, we can move to a discussion of the aspect of the theory that is specifically 
targeted by the Misrepresentation Objection.  
Unlike some other variations of higher-order theories
6
, Rosenthal is pretty clear 
that he thinks it is possible for a higher-order thought to misrepresent its bearer’s mental 
environment.  To demonstrate this possibility of misrepresentation, and to draw out the 
key fact about the theory that opens the door to the Misrepresentation Objection, let’s 
consider three sample cases. 
In the first case, a person might, for example, see a green apple.  This would lead 
her to form a first-order visual state with the content ‘green apple’.  If the subject forms 
an appropriate HOT about this visual state, perhaps with the content, roughly, ‘I see a 
green apple’, then the subject’s visual state will be state conscious.  Since the subject’s 
HOT accurately represents her mental environment, this is a case of Veridical HOT 
Representation.   
In the second case, let’s suppose instead that our subject sees a red apple and so 
she forms a first-order visual state with the content ‘red apple’.  According to Rosenthal, 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
6
 Though Rosenthal argues that a HOT is a mental state that is distinct from the lower-order state it 
represents, both Gennaro’s (1996) Wide Intrinsicality View and Van Gulick’s (2004) Higher-Order Global 
States View posit that the HOT is actually a component, along with the lower-order state it represents, in a 
larger, more complex mental state.  It might be argued, therefore, that such views can avoid the 
misrepresentation problems facing Rosenthal’s HOT account.   
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it’s completely possible that, despite having this first-order visual state of seeing a red 
apple, our subject nonetheless might form an appropriate
7
 HOT with the content ‘I see a 
green apple’.
8
  In this case, the subject’s HOT mischaracterizes her lower-order visual 
state as being about a green instead of a red apple, so this is a case of Misrepresentation.  
As we will see, this form of misrepresentation is comparatively mild however, since there 
is a lower-order state instantiated by the individual, the problem is just that it is 
mischaracterized by her HOT.  For this reason, these sorts of cases are referred to as 
cases of Mild HOT Misrepresentation. 
Finally, in the third case, we might suppose that our subject does not see any 
apples whatsoever, and hence that she forms no relevant first-order visual states at all.  
Rosenthal allows that even in this case our subject still might form an appropriate HOT 
with the content ‘I see a green apple’.  Since there is no relevant visual state in these 
cases at all, however, the HOT is not just mischaracterizing the nature of the state the 
subject is in but rather is mischaracterizing the subject as being in any such relevant 
lower-order state in the first place.  This is why these cases are known as cases of Radical 
HOT Misrepresentation or as Empty HOT cases; they are referred to as empty HOT cases 
precisely because the lower-order state the HOT represents the subject as being in is not 
in fact instantiated by the subject. 
Now, Rosenthal not only allows that all three cases are possibilities within the 
theory, but he also says that what it’s like for a person will be the same in all three cases.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
7
 Notice that by calling these HOTs appropriate, I am not saying that they are accurate or veridical 
representations.  Instead, I intend the word ‘appropriate’ to identify that the HOTs in question meet the 
various conditions Rosenthal sets out for the HOTs involved in state consciousness. (See footnote 5 for 
further discussion). 
8
 For a sample of Rosenthal’s views on the possibility of misrepresenting HOT cases see Rosenthal (2004), 
especially pg. 32-35 and Rosenthal (2005), especially pg. 217-218. 
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Specifically, since in all three cases the subject formed a HOT representing herself as 
seeing a green apple, Rosenthal says that what it’s like for the subject will be as though 
she actually is seeing a green apple in each of these cases.  Rosenthal comes to this 
conclusion because he argues that the way a HOT characterizes one’s mental 
environment will determine what it’s like for a person to be in a conscious state.  He says 
this explicitly, for example, when he writes, “…what it’s like for one will follow the way 
one’s HOT represents one’s state, even when that HOT misrepresents the state one is 
actually in” (Rosenthal (2005, p. 217).
9
  Because Rosenthal is committed to there being 
something it’s like for the subject in all three cases however, he also appears to be 
committed to saying that the subject is indeed in a conscious state in each of these cases.  
It is precisely this fact that leads Block to raise the Misrepresentation Objection. 
3. Block’s Misrepresentation Objection 
Block (2011a, 2011b) objects to the HOT theory by arguing that the conditions 
the theory says are necessary and sufficient for conscious states actually lead to 
conflicting predictions about whether someone is in a conscious state or not in empty 
HOT cases.  In light of this fact, Block argues that the theory’s explanation of conscious 
states fails and so the HOT theory should be rejected.   
To demonstrate this, Block summarizes the theory’s necessary and sufficient 
conditions as follows: “…an appropriate higher order thought is sufficient for a conscious 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
9
 Rosenthal also writes, “If I consciously take something I see to be a cow when it’s actually a horse, 
phenomenologically it’s as though I consciously see a cow.  Similarly, if I am conscious of myself as being 
in a P state, it’s phenomenologically as though I’m in such a state whether or not I am.  If I’m not in a P 
state, that will make a difference to my overall mental functioning… But the phenomenology is determined 
solely by the way I am aware of things…” (Rosenthal (2004), p. 35).  Here we see not only Rosenthal’s 
claim that the phenomenology resulting from veridical and misrepresenting HOTs will be subjectively 
indistinguishable, but also his suggestion that these subjectively indistinguishable differences might be 
detectable by other means (for example, they might make a difference to one’s overall mental functioning).  
For further discussion of this point see Rosenthal (2005), p. 29-30 and Rosenthal (2011). 
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state and…being the object of an appropriate higher order thought is necessary for a 
conscious state” (Block (2011b), p. 443, original emphasis).  Block then argues that in 
empty HOT cases, such as the third case described above, it’s clear that the condition 
sufficient for there to be a conscious state is satisfied.  Since there is an appropriate HOT 
formed in the empty HOT scenario, and since the presence of such a HOT is sufficient for 
there to be a conscious state, the theory dictates that there will be a conscious state in the 
empty HOT scenario.  As we discussed, Rosenthal says there will be something it’s like 
for the subject in this case - it will seem to her that she is seeing a green apple - so 
Rosenthal seems to agree that the subject will indeed be in a conscious state in such 
cases.  The trouble, argues Block, is that the condition necessary for there to be a 
conscious state is, at the same time, not satisfied. 
Recall that, according to Block, the necessary condition dictates that a mental 
state must be the object of an appropriate HOT if there is to be a conscious state.  In the 
empty HOT scenario, however, this is precisely what is stipulated not to be the case.  
Since the HOT is empty, there is no actually instantiated first-order state that can be said 
to be the state that the HOT represents.  Barring a dramatic shift in the theory to 
something more like a self-representational theory (i.e., to a theory wherein the HOT 
somehow represents itself
10
), there is thus no candidate for being the state that is 
represented and hence no candidate for being the state that is conscious.  Thus the 
condition necessary for there to be a conscious state fails to be satisfied in empty HOT 
cases and hence the theory also predicts that there will not be a conscious state in these 
cases. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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 For accounts from philosophers endorsing this sort of view, and their discussions of how accepting this 
view allows them to avoid the Misrepresentation Objection, see Gennaro (2012), especially Ch. 4 and 
Kriegel (2003), especially pg. 119-120.  Obviously Rosenthal does not endorse a self-representational view.  
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As it turns out then, in empty HOT cases the condition sufficient for there to be a 
conscious state is met while, at the same time, the condition necessary for there to be a 
conscious state is not satisfied.  The theory therefore predicts both that there will and that 
there will not be a conscious state in these cases.  Therein lies Block’s problem with the 
theory.  Since the HOT theory explains conscious states by providing conditions that are 
supposed to be necessary and sufficient for conscious states, and since those conditions 
turn out to be incompatible in empty HOT cases, Block argues that the HOT theory 
cannot have provided an adequate explanation of conscious states after all.  He concludes 
that the theory therefore fails and should be rejected.   
To summarize the concern slightly differently, the problem boils down to the 
following: When a HOT is empty, and thus when there is no instantiated lower-order 
mental state that can be said to be the apparently necessary object of the HOT, it seems 
that there also must be no candidate lower-order state that can be said to be the state that 
is conscious.  However, Rosenthal clearly allows that there is something it’s like for the 
bearer of empty HOTs, thus he appears to allow that there is indeed a conscious state in 
such cases.  The problem then becomes one of reconciling these two facts – the fact that 
there is something it’s like for the bearer of an empty HOT and the fact that there is no 
lower-order state that can be said to be the conscious state the bearer of that HOT is 
instantiating.  Thus we are left with an apparent tension within the theory.  We are now 
ready to see my solution to this problem. 
4. Replying to the Misrepresentation Objection 
I propose that we can reconcile the apparent tension in the HOT theory by arguing 
that each of the conflicting conditions is actually a condition for a separate sort of 
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consciousness.  To my knowledge, Rosenthal has never endorsed such a view but, as 
we’ll briefly discuss at the end of the paper, I think that support for this claim can be 
found within the HOT theory.  My argument in support of this solution begins by 
identifying the fact that the phrase ‘conscious state’ is ambiguous, so let’s turn to that 
step now.   
4.1 The Ambiguity of the Phrase ‘Conscious State’ 
I submit that the phrase ‘conscious state’ is ambiguous.  People commonly use 
one sense of the phrase ‘conscious state’ wherein this phrase describes a mental state that 
is conscious.  However, and importantly, people also commonly use another sense of the 
phrase ‘conscious state’ wherein the phrase describes a creature’s state of being 
conscious.  For example, someone might say that George is in a conscious state.  In 
saying this, the person might mean that a particular mental state of George’s, his desire 
for a drink of water, say, is conscious and hence that George has a mental state that is 
conscious.  On the other hand, the person might mean that, insofar as George is 
consciously desiring things like drinks of water and is not passed out due to dehydration, 
George himself is in a state of being conscious.
11
  Let’s examine the differences between 
these two claims a little further.  
The first sense of ‘conscious state’ identified here, according to which the phrase 
describes a mental state that is conscious, matches up with what HOT theorists are 
traditionally taken to be identifying with their notion of state consciousness.  As the HOT 
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 Those immersed in debates about the HOT theory might recognize the distinction drawn here as 
potentially mirroring the common distinction between intransitive state consciousness on the one hand and 
transitive and intransitive creature consciousness on the other.  Though I am not convinced the notion of 
subject consciousness that I introduce here will map neatly onto the usual notions of creature 
consciousness, I choose to avoid the standard terminology primarily in hopes of minimizing theoretical 
baggage and maximizing clarity.  
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theorists are most often understood to use this term (and I will share in this usage), state 
consciousness is a property attributed to mental states and it is the property that 
differentiates mental states that there’s something it’s like for their bearer to be 
instantiating from mental states that there’s nothing it’s like for their bearers to be 
instantiating.  For example, before George was distracted by the phone call from his wife, 
his desire for a drink of water was a state conscious desire and there was something it 
was like for George to have that desire.   
The second sense of ‘conscious state’ identified here is the sense captured by 
saying that a creature is in a state of being conscious.  I propose that this sense of 
‘conscious state’ identifies a property attributed to subjects (i.e., to people or other 
suitable creatures), rather than a property attributed to mental states.  I also propose that 
we can understand this property as being the property that differentiates creatures for 
whom there’s something it’s like from those for whom there’s not something it’s like.
12
  
So, for example, George might be said to have this property both before and during his 
phone call with his wife.  Before the call, what it’s like for George might be characterized 
by saying that he wanted a drink of water.  During the phone call, however, when 
George’s desire for water was no longer immediately before his mind, there would be 
some other way of characterizing what it’s like for George to be chatting with his wife.  If 
there was nothing it was like for George, however – if he was a philosophical zombie, for 
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 By using the phrase ‘something it’s like’ here, I intend to loosely identify the aspect of consciousness 
that I believe Thomas Nagel (1974) famously discusses.  This feature, according to Nagel, is something 
subjective and experiential, something it’s like for an organism to be conscious or to have a conscious 
mental state.  This essential, subjective nature of consciousness is also sometimes referred to as the 
qualitative or phenomenal character of consciousness or simply as what-it’s-like-ness.  The reader should 
note that I intend no theoretical ties to any one particular account of this sort of consciousness when I use 
these terms though.  Instead, I just mean to identify a more intuitive notion, similar to what Weisberg 
(2011) calls the “moderate” reading of these terms.  Furthermore, since I attribute this property to subjects 
rather than mental states, it’s not clear my notion of this property can be mapped onto the usual accounts 
anyway.  
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example – then George would lack the sort of property identified by this sense of 
‘conscious state’ entirely.  I propose that we call this property subject consciousness, 
since this sort of property is only attributed to subjects, not to mental states.  (After all, 
while we are fine saying that there’s something it’s like for a subject, we would find it 
quite odd to say that there’s something it’s like for a mental state.)  So here we’ve 
characterized the subject consciousness sense of ‘conscious state’. 
To recap, we have identified two separate senses of the phrase ‘conscious state’ – 
a state consciousness sense and a subject consciousness sense.  When we use ‘conscious 
state’ in the state consciousness sense we mean to identify a property attributed to mental 
states that consists in the relation between those mental states and the appropriate HOTs 
that represent them.  We also intend to identify mental states for which there’s something 
it’s like for their bearers to be in them.  On the other hand, when we use ‘conscious state’ 
in the subject consciousness sense of the phrase we mean to identify a property attributed 
to a subject and a property that differentiates subjects for whom there is something it’s 
like from subjects for whom there is nothing it’s like.   
Having identified these two different senses of the phrase ‘conscious state’, we 
are now ready to see how Block’s representation of the HOT theory’s necessary and 
sufficient conditions can be seen to equivocate on these two senses of ‘conscious state’.  
4.2 Block’s Inadvertent Equivocation on ‘Conscious State’ 
Recall, Block represented the HOT theory as endorsing the following necessary 
and sufficient conditions for conscious states:  First, that “being the object of an 
appropriate higher order thought is necessary for a conscious state” and second, that “an 
appropriate higher order thought is sufficient for a conscious state” (Block (2011b), p. 
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443, original emphasis).  Notice that each of Block’s conditions is supposed to be either 
necessary or sufficient for a conscious state.  To determine which sense of ‘conscious 
state’ is at play in each condition, let’s look at each in turn. 
As for the necessary condition, I think it’s clear that this condition must be taken 
to be using the state consciousness sense of ‘conscious state’ for the following reasons:  
First, as we saw, Rosenthal explicitly claims that there will be something it’s like for a 
creature in empty HOT cases, and these cases count as empty HOT cases precisely 
because there is no mental state that is the object of the instantiated HOT.  In light of 
these facts, the HOT theory cannot be taken as saying that it is a necessary condition for 
subject consciousness (i.e., for there being something it’s like for a subject) that there be 
a mental state that is the object of a HOT.  Such an interpretation would contradict 
Rosenthal’s claims and so would not be a fair way of interpreting the HOT theory.  Hence 
we can conclude that this necessary condition cannot be interpreted as using the subject 
consciousness sense of ‘conscious state’.   
Secondly, this necessary condition is taken to be a part of the common way of 
understanding the HOT theory’s explanation of state consciousness.  As we saw earlier, 
HOT theorists are understood to be claiming that a mental state is state conscious if and 
only if it is represented by an appropriate HOT.  Block’s necessary condition (that being 
the object of an appropriate HOT is necessary for a conscious state) clearly fits into this 
account of state consciousness.  So, since the condition does not cohere with Rosenthal’s 
comments about subject consciousness, and since it does fit with the HOT theory’s 
common account of state consciousness, it appears we must conclude that this necessary 
condition uses the phrase ‘conscious state’ in the state consciousness sense of that phrase.  
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As for the sufficient condition, “that an appropriate HOT is sufficient for a 
conscious state”, I think the most natural way to understand this condition is to see it as 
using ‘conscious state’ in the subject consciousness sense of that phrase.  My reasoning 
here is as follows:  First and, again, as we learned from Rosenthal’s comments on the 
empty HOT scenarios, the theory does dictate that whenever there is an appropriate HOT, 
there will be something it’s like for the creature who has that HOT.  Thus the HOT theory 
does appear to endorse the claim that having an appropriate HOT is sufficient for subject 
consciousness, in my sense of that term.   
Secondly, I believe we cannot make sense of this condition as applying to state 
consciousness without eliminating the very possibility of there being empty HOTs and 
hence without contradicting Rosenthal’s own claims that these scenarios are possible 
within the HOT theory.  For example, if we were to rephrase Block’s sufficient condition 
such that it explicitly refers to state consciousness, then we might end up with the 
following condition: “An appropriate HOT is sufficient for a lower-order mental state 
that is state conscious”.  Notice how this condition appears to suggest that a lower-order 
state is guaranteed to be instantiated whenever a person also instantiates an appropriate 
HOT.  We could make this result even more explicit by representing the condition as 
follows: “If a lower-order mental state is instantiated and there is an appropriate HOT 
formed about it, then that lower-order mental state is state conscious”.   
If we rephrase the condition in either of these ways, however, we appear to have 
eliminated the very possibility that a HOT can be empty in the first place.  After all, the 
fact that the lower-order state is instantiated is now built right into these versions of the 
sufficient condition, if not explicitly then implicitly.  So, in trying to interpret this 
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condition as being about state consciousness, it turns out that we are actually forced to 
deny that the HOT theory allows for the possibility of empty HOT cases.  As we saw, 
however, Rosenthal does explicitly allow that empty HOT cases are possible within the 
theory.  Since it turns out, then, that the sufficient conditions resulting from a state 
consciousness interpretation of ‘conscious state’ are in direct conflict with Rosenthal’s 
claims about the theory, we must conclude that interpreting this sufficient condition to be 
using the state consciousness sense of ‘conscious state’ is not a fair way of representing 
the HOT theory.   
Instead, given that Rosenthal intends the theory to allow for the possibility of 
empty HOT scenarios and given that Rosenthal does say that one’s having a HOT is 
sufficient for there being something it’s like for one in such cases, I conclude that the 
most appropriate interpretation of the sufficient condition is therefore the one that takes it 
to be using the subject consciousness sense of ‘conscious state’. 
To bring these insights together now, we’ve seen that each of Block’s conditions 
actually seems to be a condition for a different sort of consciousness.  His necessary 
condition seems to be identifying something that’s necessary for state consciousness, 
whereas his sufficient condition seems to be identifying something that’s sufficient for 
subject consciousness.  Once the phrase ‘conscious state’ is disambiguated in these ways, 
we can reconstruct Block’s statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions as 
follows:  A creature’s having an appropriate HOT is sufficient for a creature’s being 
subject conscious and a mental state’s being the object of an appropriate HOT is 
necessary for the mental state to be state conscious.  With these clarifications in place we 
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can see clearly now that Block’s presentation of the theory’s necessary and sufficient 
conditions does involve a problematic equivocation on the phrase ‘conscious state’.  
4.3 Three Lessons 
There are three lessons we can draw from the above analysis.  Let’s look at each 
in turn. 
4.3.1. The First Lesson – Two Explanations Within the Higher-Order Thought 
Theory 
The first lesson is that the HOT theory can now be seen as providing two separate 
explanations, one for each sense of ‘conscious state’ that was identified.
13
  Let’s see how 
each explanation can be drawn out of the facts that we have established already.   
First, since we have established that a mental state’s being the object of an 
appropriate HOT is taken to be a necessary condition for state consciousness, we can hold 
that condition constant and draw out the following explanation of state consciousness: 
State Consciousness  
If a mental state, x, is the object of an appropriate HOT, then x is state 
conscious. 
If a mental state, x, is state conscious, then x is the object of an appropriate 
HOT. 
 
Hence, a mental state’s being the object of an appropriate HOT is both necessary and 
sufficient for that mental state to be state conscious.  
Second, since we established that a creature’s having an appropriate HOT can be 
taken to be a sufficient condition for that creature’s being subject conscious, we can hold 
that condition constant and draw out the following explanation of subject consciousness: 
 
 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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 Again, note that Rosenthal has never claimed that his account provides two separate explanations.  As I 
argue later in the paper, however, I believe there is support for my account within his theory. 
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Subject Consciousness 
If a creature, y, is having an appropriate HOT, then y is being subject 
conscious. 
If a creature, y, is being subject conscious, then y is having an appropriate 
HOT. 
 
Hence, a creature’s having an appropriate HOT is both necessary and sufficient for the 
creature’s being subject conscious.   
Thus we can see that there are indeed two explanations that can be provided by 
the HOT theory – one explanation of state consciousness and one explanation of subject 
consciousness. 
4.3.2 The Second Lesson – No Internal Incompatibility 
The second lesson is that once we’ve identified these different explanations, we 
can see that neither has conditions that are internally incompatible in the empty HOT 
scenario.  (This result is summarized in Table 3 and I will refer to that table throughout 
the analysis.)  
We can see in the first row of Table 3 Block’s original statement of the HOT 
theory’s necessary and sufficient conditions.  In each of the second and third rows I have 
provided a reconstruction of the actual necessary and sufficient conditions that the HOT 
theory can be seen as providing for state consciousness and subject consciousness 
respectively.  Notice that Block’s ambiguous phrase ‘conscious state’ (represented in 
bold in row 1) is disambiguated in each new condition (as shown in the italicized parts of 
rows 2 and 3).  Also notice that the condition we found to be appropriate for each sort of 
consciousness is held constant within the appropriate row (as highlighted by asterisks). 
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Table 3. Clarifying the necessary and sufficient conditions provided by the Higher-Order 
Thought Theory. 
  
Necessary 
Condition 
 
Sufficient 
Condition 
 
Result in Empty HOT Scenario 
 
Block’s 
Representation 
of the HOT 
Theory’s 
Conditions 
 
“being the 
object of an 
appropriate 
higher order 
thought is 
necessary for a 
conscious 
state” 
 
 
“[having] an 
appropriate 
higher order 
thought is 
sufficient for a 
conscious 
state” 
 
There is no object of the HOT so 
the necessary condition is not 
satisfied.  The subject does have 
an appropriate HOT, so the 
sufficient condition is satisfied. 
The two conditions lead to 
differing predictions about the 
presence of a conscious state in 
empty HOT cases - there is an 
incompatibility among these 
conditions. 
 
 
State 
Consciousness 
Sense of 
‘Conscious 
State’ 
 
A mental 
state’s being 
the object of 
an appropriate 
HOT is 
necessary for 
the mental 
state to be 
state conscious 
 
*A mental 
state’s being 
the object of 
an appropriate 
HOT* is 
sufficient for 
the mental 
state to be 
state conscious 
 
 
There is no state that is the object 
of the HOT, so neither condition 
will be satisfied.  Both conditions 
predict that there will not be a 
state conscious state in empty 
HOT cases - there is no 
incompatibility among these 
conditions.  
 
 
Subject 
Consciousness 
Sense of 
‘Conscious 
State’ 
 
*A creature’s 
having an 
appropriate 
HOT* is 
necessary for 
the creature’s 
being subject 
conscious 
 
A creature’s 
having an 
appropriate 
HOT is 
sufficient for 
the creature’s 
being subject 
conscious 
 
 
There is a creature with an 
appropriate HOT, so both 
conditions will be satisfied.  Both 
conditions predict that there 
creature will be subject conscious 
in empty HOT cases - there is no 
incompatibility among these 
conditions. 
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With all these clarifications in place, we can now see that the new conditions for 
each sort of consciousness are not internally incompatible in the empty HOT case after 
all.  Let’s look at the results for state consciousness first. 
The newly clarified conditions for state consciousness are as follows: A mental 
state’s being the object of an appropriate HOT is necessary for the mental state to be state 
conscious and *a mental state’s being the object of an appropriate HOT* is sufficient for 
the mental state to be state conscious.   
We can now see that, rather than there being an incompatibility of predicted 
outcomes here, the conditions for state consciousness (as we and the objectors understand 
that property) just fail to be satisfied in the empty HOT scenario.  That is, since there is 
no state that is the object of an appropriate HOT and since this condition is both 
necessary and sufficient for state consciousness, the theory, as I’ve interpreted it, predicts 
that there will not be any state conscious mental state in empty HOT cases.  Block’s 
charge of an incompatibility among necessary and sufficient conditions therefore fails to 
be realized here.   
Notice that, since the very circumstances of an empty HOT scenario dictate that 
there is no lower-order state present, and hence that there is no lower-order state to which 
we could attribute the property of state consciousness in the first place, this result is not 
problematic for the theory.  When a HOT is empty, it turns out to be true both that there 
is no state that is the object of the HOT and also that there is no state to which we can 
attribute the property of state consciousness anyway.  Hence the result that there is no 
state conscious state in these cases should not be alarming. 
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As for subject consciousness, the newly clarified conditions are as follows: *A 
creature’s having an appropriate HOT* is necessary for the creature’s being subject 
conscious and a creature’s having an appropriate HOT is sufficient for the creature’s 
being subject conscious. 
Since these conditions make no mention of the lower-order state that fails to be 
instantiated in empty HOT cases, we can see that these conditions are both satisfied and, 
as Rosenthal has maintained, the theory therefore predicts that there will be something 
it’s like for the creature in the empty HOT cases.  Furthermore, since the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for subject consciousness are here both satisfied, there turns out not 
to be any internal incompatibility among the conditions for subject consciousness in 
empty HOT cases either.  Block’s charge of an internal incompatibility among conditions 
again fails to be realized.  
In light of these findings, we can conclude that in empty HOT cases there is no 
internal incompatibility among the conditions we’ve now taken the HOT theory to 
provide, either for state consciousness or for subject consciousness.  The conditions for 
state consciousness both fail to be met in empty HOT scenarios and the conditions for 
subject consciousness are both satisfied in empty HOT scenarios.  From here we can 
conclude that Block’s charge that the HOT theory has internally incompatible conditions 
in empty HOT cases is actually based on his accidental combination of one condition 
from each of the two separate explanations.  Since the HOT theory provides no 
explanation consisting of those two conditions together, and hence the theory has no 
explanation with internally incompatible conditions, we can safely reject Block’s 
Misrepresentation Objection.  
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This clarification of the explanations provided by the HOT theory not only 
eliminates the objection but also helps us to understand how Block might have fallen into 
endorsing this objection in the first place.  The most obvious reason for this mistake is 
clearly the fact that Rosenthal has never said that the theory provides two separate 
explanations, hence Block can hardly be faulted for failing to notice that the two 
conditions he identifies are part of two different explanations contained within the theory. 
Even more interestingly, however, we now also can see how Block’s mistake of 
running together a condition from each of the different explanations would be an easy 
mistake to make, even if he was aware of the presence of the two separate explanations.  
The reason is that both of these separate explanations actually take the formation of an 
appropriate HOT to be a necessary condition for their particular sort of consciousness.  
Specifically, mental states are state conscious when appropriate HOTs are formed about 
them, so a HOT must be formed in order for any mental state to be state conscious, and 
creatures are subject conscious when they are representing via HOTs, so a HOT also must 
be formed in order for any creature to be subject conscious.  Given this parallel in the 
theory’s explanations of the two sorts of consciousness, we can see clearly now that it 
would be rather easy to confuse the conditions involved in the two explanations.   
4.3.3 The Third Lesson – Subject Consciousness Without State Consciousness 
And now, with the objection safely eliminated, we can finally come to our third 
lesson.  We can see now that what is, in fact, the case in empty HOT scenarios is that no 
mental state is state conscious, yet there’s still something it’s like for the creature with the 
empty HOT; the creature with the empty HOT is still subject conscious, in my sense of 
that term.  Since we’ve separated the notions of state and subject consciousness, this 
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result is not problematic for the theory.  The theory can simply be understood as dictating 
that the subject of an empty HOT can be subject conscious without, at the same time, 
having any individual mental states that are state conscious. 
In coming to this conclusion, we also have finally identified the point at which the 
objection departs from the HOT theory.  Objectors appear to have been taking state 
consciousness to play a bigger role in determining the presence and character of subject 
consciousness than the HOT theory ends up allowing.
14
  Though on our understanding of 
the HOT theory, part of what we mean when we say a mental state is state conscious is 
that there is something it’s like for the bearer of that state to be instantiating that state at 
that time, it turns out that what it’s like for the subject, the character of her subject 
consciousness, is not directly determined by her state conscious state after all.  Again, it 
now seems obvious that this would have to be the case, since a subject can have subject 
consciousness without having any relevant state conscious mental state at all. 
Furthermore, we’ve seen that there is support for this interpretation in Rosenthal’s 
own comments, as he says that there will be something it’s like for a creature with empty 
HOTs and that what it’s like for this creature will be determined by the way its HOTs 
represent the creature’s mental environment.  In saying these things, Rosenthal also 
appears to be claiming that lower-order states (those states represented by HOTs) have no 
direct role to play in grounding what it’s like for a creature in empty HOT scenarios.  I 
take it, therefore, that he is drawing a very similar conclusion to the one that I am 
drawing when I say that creatures can be subject conscious without having any mental 
states that are state conscious.  So Rosenthal and I appear to end up with converging 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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 This mistake is abundantly clear, for example, in the form of the Misrepresentation Objection raised by 
Neander (1998) and Levine (2001). 
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accounts of the HOT theory after all, despite arriving at our conclusions by means of 
different response strategies.
15
  
For HOT theorists, then, there are a few interesting outcomes of the reply I’ve 
presented here, which I’d like to take a moment to note.  First, though it might be 
surprising to say that a creature can have subject consciousness without having any 
mental states that are state conscious, this claim appears to be in line with Rosenthal’s 
more careful comments about the HOT theory.  Perhaps we can take it as an added 
benefit of my solution, then, that it brings to light an important and underexplored aspect 
of the HOT theory of consciousness.  I predict that there is fruitful research to be done 
exploring this consequence further.  HOT theorists owe us a more detailed account of the 
connections (and disconnections) between state and subject consciousness. 
Second, the fact that the theory has this surprising result about the independence 
of subject consciousness from state consciousness is not itself any reason to reject the 
HOT theory.  The objectors may not be convinced yet that this account is correct, but 
they no longer have any specific reason to reject the theory on this basis.  So we have 
succeeded in defeating the Misrepresentation Objection.  Furthermore, since we’ve 
accomplished all this with a discussion presented in the terms objectors are familiar with, 
I hope that we’ve reached these conclusions in a way that objectors also will find more 
convincing.   
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 Though Rosenthal and I allow that there might be no direct role for state conscious states to play in 
determining phenomenal character, it still might be the case that these states do play a necessary though 
indirect role in accounts of HOT representation and hence in accounts of subject consciousness.  For 
example, a HOT might not be able to misrepresent someone as being in a state of pain if it weren’t for the 
fact that the person was also able to form an accurate representation of herself as being in pain.  Though I 
note this complication for the reader, I do not intend to follow up on this point here.   
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5. Conclusion 
To recap, we defeated the Misrepresentation Objection by first disambiguating the 
phrase ‘conscious state’ in order to identify two sorts of consciousness, each with its own 
separate explanation provided by the HOT theory.  We then saw that, in empty HOT 
cases, neither of these separate explanations have internally incompatible conditions.  
Instead, it turned out that the Misrepresentation Objection was based on Block’s 
inadvertently running together a condition from each of the two separate explanations.  
We were thereby able to reject the Misrepresentation Objection.  Finally, we saw that one 
consequence of interpreting the HOT theory in the manner suggested here was that the 
HOT theory must now be taken as denying any direct role for first-order states in 
grounding the phenomenal character of conscious experience (at least in empty HOT 
cases).  We also saw, however, that, though controversial, this consequence both is 
predicted by Rosenthal and is not in itself a legitimate reason to reject the HOT theory.  
Thus the HOT theory was successfully defended against the Misrepresentation Objection 
and this defense was conducted in terms that the objector should find convincing. 
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Conclusion 
 
To conclude this dissertation, I’d like to present some reflections on the 
discussions just provided.  The main lessons of this dissertation are, I believe, identified 
by the very title of the project: The Resilience of a Refined Higher-Order Thought Theory 
of Consciousness. 
The reference to resilience in the title reflects the fact that this dissertation 
consists of three independent papers, each defending the HOT Theory of Consciousness 
against a different objection.  As we saw, I defeat the Theory of Mind objection by 
demonstrating that the metarepresentational capacities measured by Theory of Mind tests 
are not parallel to the metarepresentational capacities required by the HOT theory for the 
formation of HOTs, hence that the objection, which is based on assuming these 
requirements are parallel, can be rejected.   
I defeat the Phenomenal Character Argument by showing that the HOT theory 
cannot provide an account of phenomenal character (or subject consciousness) that 
requires a person to become suddenly and immediately conscious of what her HOTs 
represent.  Hence this objection, which is based on the assumption that HOT theorists do 
provide such an account, can be rejected.   
Finally, I defeat the Misrepresentation Objection by demonstrating that the HOT 
theory actually contains two different explanations of two different sorts of 
consciousness.  Once these explanations are separated, we see that the objection is 
actually based on a confusion about the relationship between these two accounts, rather 
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than being based on any incompatibility within either account, hence I show that this 
objection also can be rejected.   
Insofar as I am able to defeat these objections, then, I take it that I have shown the 
HOT theory to be resilient.   
Another key word in the title is ‘refined’.  Most discussions of the HOT theory are 
focused on its account of mental state consciousness – the property that differentiates 
mental states when they are conscious, from mental states when they are not conscious.  
Though I do not deny that this is an important aspect of the theory, my arguments 
throughout the dissertation suggest that there is another important aspect to the HOT 
theory, one that seems to go largely unnoticed in critical discussions.  As we’ve seen, this 
second aspect is an account of what it’s like for a person – an account of phenomenal 
character or subject consciousness.  I argue that this second account is importantly 
distinct from the theory’s account of mental state consciousness and that this account of 
subject consciousness appears to have significant explanatory power.  
To see how this side of the project is realized consider, for example, that we learn 
in the second paper that the character of phenomenal experience, literally what it is like 
for a person, can be captured in terms of one’s coming to have, immediately before one’s 
mind, the content of a represented lower-order state
1
, rather than the content of a HOT 
itself.  This shows us that the character of subject consciousness is not explained in terms 
higher-order representation and hence, that the account of subject consciousness might be 
importantly distinct from any account the theory provides of state consciousness.   
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"Strictly speaking, we might say that what comes immediately before one’s mind is actually the content 
that a HOT represents a lower-order state as having, as phrasing things in this more precise way allows us 
to capture the character of the subject consciousness afforded in Empty HOT scenarios."
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We see a similar lesson in the third paper as well, where we learn that the refined 
HOT theory allows for the possibility that a person might be subject conscious without 
also having a mental state that is state conscious.  This is further evidence that state 
consciousness and subject consciousness are importantly distinct sorts of consciousness 
and also that the explanations offered of these two sorts of consciousness are importantly 
distinct within the theory.   
Finally, we see the potential explanatory power of such an account of subject 
consciousness at work in the first paper, since it is only by bringing to light the 
Phenomenal Character Principle and the Awareness Principle, both of which are aspects 
of the refined HOT theory’s account of subject consciousness, that we are able to 
demonstrate why the evidence from TOM tests is not able to support the TOM objection.   
Hence, the theory that is shown to be resilient, insofar as it is capable of defeating 
these objections, is also found to be a new and refined version of the HOT theory of 
consciousness. 
No philosophical discussion seems to be complete if it fails to offer up new 
questions for future research.  Thankfully, it seems there are many new questions raised 
by this project and I’d like to conclude this discussion by highlighting one such question 
in particular.
2
  Though I cannot provide a complete response to this question here, as 
doing so would be the foundation of yet another research paper, I will make a few 
comments in response to this concern, in hopes of helping us reflect a little more on some 
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 Thank you to Professor William Seager for bringing this concern to my attention (in a commentary on an 
earlier draft of the third paper, presented at the Canadian Philosophical Association Conference in May 
2012) and to Professor Andrew Brook for also raising this concern (in comments on an earlier draft of this 
dissertation). 
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of the ideas introduced in this work and in hopes of suggesting potential avenues for 
further inquiry.  So here is the question:  
Is the account of consciousness put forth in this dissertation still a higher-
order account of consciousness?   
Let’s first look a little further into the motivation for such a concern.   
The HOT theory originally might have been understood as an attempt to explain 
consciousness in terms of the structural relations between some mental states and other 
thoughts that represent those mental states.  Furthermore, such an understanding might 
have suggested that we identify certain states as being higher-order states in the first 
place, precisely because they instantiate the right sorts of structural relationships with 
other, lower-order mental states.  Given this way of understanding the theory, however, 
there ought to be no thoughts that count as higher-order thoughts, and there ought to be 
no explanation of consciousness available either, when it turns out that no lower-order 
state is instantiated.   
Since we learn, in the third paper of this dissertation, that the refined HOT theory 
allows one to have subject consciousness without this structural relation holding (i.e., 
without there being a relation between one’s higher-order thought and a lower-order state, 
because no lower-order state is instantiated), then it might seem both that some sort of 
consciousness is being explained without appeal to the structural relationship that 
appeared to be necessary for a higher-order explanation of consciousness and, 
furthermore, that certain thoughts are being identified as higher-order thoughts while 
failing to stand in the appropriate structural relationships to other mental states.   
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In short, if we agree that an explanation is provided in higher-order terms only if 
it appeals to the right structural relations among mental states, and if we agree that a 
thought counts as a higher-order thought only if it stands in the right structural relation to 
other mental states, then the refined higher-order thought theory presented in this 
dissertation appears to have given up the game of providing a higher-order account of 
consciousness. 
Here is a brief sketch of one possible reply to this concern:  Perhaps state 
consciousness traditionally has been explained by appeal to this sort of structural relation.  
Though Rosenthal (2005) suggests that he never actually intended for state consciousness 
to be a relational property of mental states (instead he says that any reference to this 
property as being relational was just a useful shorthand
3
), I have been happy, in this 
dissertation, to leave that common interpretation of the theory intact and hence to 
maintain that state consciousness really is this sort of relational property.  That is why, in 
the third paper, I come to the conclusion that there is no instantiation of state 
consciousness in empty HOT scenarios.  Since there is no relation instantiated, because 
there is no lower-order state to comprise one of the relata in this relation (and also no 
lower-order state to instantiate the property of state consciousness), I argue that there will 
fail to be any mental state that is state conscious in empty HOT scenarios.  Hence my 
account of state consciousness should not be in jeopardy of loosing its status as a higher-
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"For example, we see this when Rosenthal writes, “Since there can be something it’s like for one to be in a 
state with particular mental qualities even if no such state occurs, a mental state’s being conscious is not 
strictly speaking a relational property of that state. A state’s being conscious consists in its being a state one 
is conscious of oneself as being in.  Still, it’s convenient to speak loosely of the property of a state’s being 
conscious as relational so as to stress that it is in any case not an intrinsic property of mental states” 
(Rosenthal (2005), p. 211). 
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order account, because it does fall in line with the traditional way of identifying higher-
order accounts in terms of their appeal to structural relations among mental states.  
On the other hand, I have also suggested that another sort of consciousness, 
subject consciousness, is present in these empty HOT scenarios, and hence is present 
when the apparently necessary relations are not instantiated.  In fact, I have argued 
explicitly that subject consciousness is not a relational property of mental states, but 
rather it is a property of subjects – people or other suitable creatures – themselves.  The 
account of subject consciousness that emerges from my dissertation is one in which a 
subject’s higher-order representing, of herself as being in certain mental states, is both 
necessary and sufficient for her being subject conscious.  So it is not a relation between 
mental states that matters here, but rather a particular sort of representing. 
But now we return to the second side of this question – if the representations 
involved do not stand in the appropriate structural relations to other mental states, how 
can they count as being higher-order representations?  And if they do not count as being 
higher-order representations, how can my explanation count as a higher-order 
explanation of subject consciousness?   
My response to this worry is as follows:  We can identify certain thoughts as 
being higher-order thoughts by appealing to their content, rather than appealing to their 
extrinsic structural relations.  That is, thoughts will be identified as being higher-order 
thoughts only if they are representations of other mental states (and hence only if they 
involve the activation of concepts for other mental states like BELIEVE, DOUBT, DESIRE, 
SMELL, and so on).
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"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
'
"Note, my claim here need not be that a thought counts as a higher-order thought only if it involves the 
very concepts of belief, doubt, and so on that we use in our western adult folk-psychology.  There is room 
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Furthermore, to be the kinds of higher-order thoughts that figure in the 
explanations offered here, these higher-order thoughts must also meet Rosenthal’s (2002) 
further conditions on appropriateness.  That is, they must be noninferential, 
nondispositional, assertoric thoughts to the effect that one is, oneself, in a particular 
mental state.
5
  
Finally, since one can token a thought about one’s mental environment even 
though that thought is not a veridical representation of that environment, in the same way 
that one can token a thought about one’s external environment even though that thought 
is not a veridical representation of the external environment, we can see that it is possible 
to identify thoughts as being higher-order thoughts, on this characterization, without 
there being a lower-order thought instantiated that bears the right structural relation to the 
higher-order thought.   
In short, if we type thoughts by means of their content (or by means of their 
activation of certain concepts) then we can identify certain mental states as higher-order 
states, without concern for the structural relations they actually stand in.  This means, 
therefore, that the account of subject consciousness offered here would count as a higher-
order explanation of subject consciousness, precisely because the thoughts that figure as 
necessary components of this explanation do in fact count as being higher-order 
representations.  Again, the account of subject consciousness that emerges from my 
dissertation is one in which a subject’s higher-order representing, of herself as being in 
certain mental states, is both necessary and sufficient for her being subject conscious.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
here for allowing that other, perhaps less rich, concepts for mental state types might be sufficient, and 
presumably certain creatures or even young human infants might make use of these other concepts."
(
"For a concise discussion of the conditions that make a HOT appropriate, see Rosenthal (2002), especially 
Section II: “The Hypothesis”, pg. 408-411."
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And the subject’s act of representing counts as an act of higher-order representing, 
precisely because it involves the activation of concepts for other mental states.   
Now, as we saw in the first paper of the dissertation, this metarepresentational 
requirement, the requirement that a subject be able to represent her other mental states, 
may be a feat that some subjects are unable to accomplish.  This would mean that those 
subjects could not form the HOTs necessary for both state consciousness and subject 
consciousness, hence this would mean that there should not be anything it’s like for such 
subjects.  As I also argued in the first paper, the evidence we have currently, from 
comparative and developmental psychology, is inconclusive as to whether any creatures 
fail to meet these metarepresentational requirements, so we currently do not have any 
reason to suspect that this aspect of the theory is problematic.   
Note, however, that the question of whether or not a creature can meet these 
metarepresentational requirements is an empirical question, and the fact that the refined 
HOT theory raises questions that can be tested empirically is actually a fact that bodes 
well for the theory.  If we find empirical evidence that suggests creatures can be subject 
conscious without forming the right higher-order thoughts, the theory would be falsified.  
I consider it to be an indication of the strength of the current theory that it makes 
empirical predictions and that it is susceptible to empirical falsification.   
To sum up, then, though we might care less about the name we use for the 
account and more about the account’s potential to get us a better understanding of 
consciousness and to provide us with empirically testable hypotheses, one might resist 
the urge to abandon all ties to the Higher-Order family of accounts just yet for the 
following reasons:  It still seems rather important, even on the refined account presented 
!!!"#&!
"
!
here, that both sorts of consciousness I have distinguished still require HOT formation.  
That is, no existing lower-order mental state will instantiate the relational property of 
state consciousness unless its bearer forms an appropriate HOT about herself as being in 
that state.  Furthermore, no person will be subject conscious unless that person forms an 
appropriate HOT about herself as being in some other mental state (regardless of whether 
that higher-order representation is veridical).  Since we can identify thoughts as being 
higher-order thoughts on the basis of their content (or on the basis of the concepts they 
require a creature to activate), rather than having to rely on the actual structural relations 
these thoughts bear to other mental states, we can see that the thoughts involved in this 
account can truly count as being higher-order thoughts, and we can maintain that the 
account of consciousness offered here is truly a higher-order account of consciousness.   
As mentioned in some of the papers, there are still many other questions this 
account raises as well.  For example, since we’ve distinguished two sorts of 
consciousness we can now ask what the relationship is between subject consciousness 
and state consciousness and what kinds of roles each sort of consciousness plays for an 
organism.  We might also ask what sorts of entities our refined HOT theory would posit 
as the reduction base of each of these separate sorts of properties.  Finally, and 
importantly, we might explore the implications these accounts have for the empirical 
work currently being conducted.  Have the ideas presented here gotten us closer to 
answering questions about the neural correlates of consciousness?  Or have they 
suggested other ways in which it might be better to understand the relationship between 
our minds and our brains?  Has the analysis offered in the first paper shed any light on 
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experimental procedures that might help us to better assess the metarepresentational 
capacities of subjects in theory of mind tests?   
Though I will not attempt to answer these questions here, it is my hope that the 
account I have offered sparks curiosity in the minds of fellow philosophers and 
psychologists, and that questions such as the ones identified here will now take centre 
stage in future research on the (refined) Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. 
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